Corporate Governance and Leadership : First international forum. Paris. White paper by Charléty, Patricia
Corporate Governance and Leadership : First
international forum. Paris. White paper
Patricia Charle´ty
To cite this version:
Patricia Charle´ty. Corporate Governance and Leadership : First international forum. Paris.
White paper. ISBN : 978-2-36456-086-4. 2013, pp.80. <hal-00834121v3>
HAL Id: hal-00834121
https://hal-essec.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00834121v3
Submitted on 5 Jul 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 
 
WHITE PAPER 
 
 
 
 
Corporate Governance 
and Leadership  
 
1st International Forum, Paris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
White paper editor and coordinator: Professor Patricia Charléty, ESSEC Business School  
 
SPONSORS and PARTNERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
McKinsey & 
Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SAP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Deere 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eastmoney.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wilhelm Müller-
Foundation 
 
PARTNERS 
 
 
 
 
OECD 
 
 
 
 
 
IFA 
GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE PARTNER 
 
With special thanks to our global knowledge partner:  
 
 
McKinsey & Company is an international management consulting firm that helps leading corporations and organizations make 
distinctive, lasting and substantial improvements in their performance. Over the past eight decades, the firm’s primary objective has 
remained constant: to serve as an organization’s most trusted external advisor on critical issues facing senior management. 
 
SPEAKERS 
 
Mr. Pierre Bollon, Executive Officer, French Asset 
Management Association 
Dr. Werner Brandt, CFO and member of the 
Executive Board and Global Managing Board of 
SAP AG 
Mr. Stuart Cable, Goodwin Procter LLP 
Mr. Alain Champigneux, Employee Elected Board 
Member, Renault 
Mr. André Chieng, Chairman, AEC, China 
Ms. Noreen Doyle, Director, Credit Suisse 
Mr. Michel de Fabiani, Board Member and 
Chairman, Appointments, Remuneration and 
Governance Committee, Vallourec 
Mr. Blaise Ganguin, Head of Corporate Ratings - 
EMEA & Managing Director, Standard & Poor's 
Mr. Vincent Gombault, Managing Director Funds 
of Funds and Private Debt, Axa Private Equity 
Mr. Jean-Louis Grevet, Founding and Managing 
Partner, Perceva Capital 
Mr. Pierre Guyot, CEO, John Deere France 
Mr. Bernard Icard, Head of Equity Proprietary 
Investment, Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
Mr. Mats Isaksson, Head of Corporate Affairs 
Department, OECD 
Mr. Eric Labaye, Director McKinsey & Co. 
Mr. Héctor Lehuedé, Senior Policy Analyst at the 
OECD Corporate Affairs Division 
Ms. Susan Lindenauer, Director, Women's Legal 
Defense Funds 
Prof. Katsunori Mikuniya, University of Tokyo; 
Former Commissioner, Financial Services Agency 
of Japan 
Prof. Klaus-Peter Müller, Chairman of the 
Supervisory Board of Commerzbank AG, 
Chairman, Government Commission on the 
German Corporate Governance Code 
Mr. Gilles Pélisson, Former Chairman, ACCOR 
Group; Independent Director, Accenture, TF1, BIC, 
NH Hotels 
Mr. Thierry Peugeot, Chairman, Supervisory Board, 
Peugeot SA 
Mr. Geoffroy Roux de Bezieux, CEO OMEA Telecom 
Dr. Götz Schmidt-Bremme, Chief, Economic Affairs, 
German Embassy of Paris 
Mr. Bernhard Simon, Managing Director and 
Family Spokesman, Executive Management 
Board, Dachser GmbH 
Mr. Peter Solmssen, General Counsel, Siemens 
Mr. Vegard Torsnes, Ownership Policy Group, 
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) 
Mr. John C. Wilcox, CEO, Sodali 
 
Mr. Yayoi Aihara, student at Keio Business School 
Prof. Sridhar Arcot, ESSEC Business School 
Ms. Marret Arfsten, student at Tuck School of 
Business at Dartmouth 
Prof.  Rodrigo Bandeira de Mello, Fundação 
Getulio Vargas-EAESP 
Prof. Patricia Langohr, ESSEC Business School 
Ms. Hélène Luciani, student at ESSEC Business 
School 
Prof. Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, University of 
Mannheim, Business School 
Prof. Yasuhiro Ohta, Keio Business School 
 
 
  
 
  
  
 iii 
Prof. Viviane de Beaufort, ESSEC Business School 
Prof. Chao Chen, School of Management, Fudan 
University 
Prof. Holger Daske, University of Mannheim, 
Business School 
Prof. Jose-Miguel Gaspar, ESSEC Business School 
Mr. Cem Kiper, student at ESSEC Business School / 
University of Mannheim 
Dr. Christoph Schneider, University of Mannheim 
Business School 
Prof. Katsuhiko Shimizu, Keio Business School 
Mr. Zhi Hao Kevin Tay, student at Tuck School of 
Business at Dartmouth 
Prof. Karin Thorburn, Norwegian School of 
Economics, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Prof. Xiaozu Wang, Fudan University 
 
THE ACADEMIC COMMITTEE 
 
Prof. Patricia Charléty, Head of the Academic Committee, ESSEC Business School 
Prof. Pei Sun, School of Management, Fudan University 
Prof. Atsuomi Obayashi, Keio Business School 
Prof. Ernst Maug, University of Mannheim 
Prof. Pino Audia, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Prof. B. Espen Eckbo, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
 
DEANS’ REPRESENTATIVES – Forum Organization Committee 
 
Dr. Gérard Guibilato, ESSEC Business School and Executive Director of the Council 
Prof. Julia von Maltzan Pacheco,  FGV-EAESP 
Mrs. June Huang, School of Management, Fudan University 
Mrs. Stephanie Xu, School of Management, Fudan University 
Ms. Kaoru Kono, Keio Business School 
Mr. Christopher McHale, Keio Business School 
Mr. Satoshi Nakamura, Keio Business School 
Mr. Takashi Watabe, Keio Business School 
Mr. Koji Yamaki, Keio Business School 
Dr. Ingo Bayer, University of Mannheim 
Mrs. Tatiana Briamonte Geiser, University of Mannheim 
Mrs. Christina Vonhoff, University of Mannheim 
Mrs. Penny Paquette, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
 
COMMUNICATION & PRESS RELATIONS TEAM 
 
Mrs. Céline Leroy, Mrs. Danielle Steele, Mrs. Luisa Maschio, Mrs. Claire Finot, Mrs. Leila Capiaux, Mrs. 
Céline Laurier, Mrs. Nadege Daouya, Mr. Marco Serri, Mr. Benjamin Six, Ms. Meng Xu, ESSEC Business 
School 
Mrs. Elsa Huang, School of Management, Fudan University 
Mrs. Mari Hirata, Keio Business School 
Mrs. Liane Weitert, University of Mannheim 
Mrs. Kim Keating, Communication team coordinator, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
 
Agence Les Evadés 
BullsEye Resources 
Flannel  
Network Fortress Solutions 
 
With special thanks to:  
The student participants of the Schools 
Mrs. Tessa Chatagnon, Council Secretariat General Coordinator 
Mrs. Patricia Palmiotto, Executive Director, Center for Business & Society, Tuck School of Business at 
Dartmouth who coordinated the student survey and student input 
Mr. Jean-Pierre Choulet, Director of External Affairs, ESSEC Business School, for White Paper input and 
project supervision 
Mrs. Isabel Torcheux, Publishing Manager, ESSEC Business School 
Mrs. Agnès Kerecki, partnerships search and administration, ESSEC Business School 
Mr. Matt Symonds, Journalist, Forum Master of Ceremonies and White Paper editing  
Mr. Tom Gamble, White Paper Editing and design 
 
 
  
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
COPYRIGHT 
 
 
Corporate Governance and Leadership 
 
ISBN: 978-2-36456-086-4 
 
 
The information and contents of this White paper are the property of the Council on Business & Society 
and may not be reproduced, copied, edited or used without the prior agreement of the former.  
 
Produced by ESSEC Publishing for the Council on Business and Society. 
 
2013 Council on Business & Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 v 
CONTENTS 
 
Acknowledgements II-IV 
Contents V-VI 
Foreword VII 
Council on Business and Society Statements VIII 
Executive Summary IX-X 
  
Chapter 1: AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP  
Introduction 11 
1. What are the challenges of doing business in the 21st century? 12-16 
Insights 16 
Food for thought section 16 
2. Governance and leadership at a crossroads 17-19 
Insights 19 
Food for thought section 19 
Professors and Speakers 20 
  
Chapter 2: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIETY   
Introduction 21 
1. The economic context: Corporate governance – strongly needed but 
effective only if market governance and long-termism prevail 
22-23 
Insights 23 
Food for thought section 24 
2. The cultural context: Corporate governance – the German answer to a 
global issue 
25-26 
Insights 26 
Food for thought section 26 
3. The legislative context: Governance and the role of government 27-28 
Insights 28 
Food for thought section 28 
Professors and Speakers 29 
  
Chapter 3: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE  
Introduction 30 
1. Corporate bond financing, credit risk, ratings and governance 31-32 
Insights 32 
Food for thought section 32 
2. Audit and optimal financial disclosures 33-34 
Insights 34 
Food for thought section 34 
3. Private equity investments, value creation and social consequences 35-36 
Insights 36 
Food for thought section 37 
4. Shareholder powers and responsibilities and Engagement policies with 
active institutional investors 
38-41 
Insights 41 
Food for thought section 41 
Professors and Speakers 42 
  
Chapter 4: GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD  
Introduction 43 
1. Trends in board leadership and shareholder engagement policies 44-47 
Insights 48 
Food for thought section 48 
 
  
 vi 
2. Leadership of family and state firm boards 49-50 
Insights 50 
Food for thought section 51 
3. Women on boards: of gender and power 52-55 
Insights 55 
Food for thought section 56 
4. Employee participation on the board 57-58 
Insights 58 
Food for thought section 58 
5. Board crisis management: China v. the US 59-60 
Insights 60 
Food for thought section 60 
Professors and Speakers 61 
  
Chapter 5: GOVERNANCE, THE CEO AND LEADERSHIP  
Introduction 62 
1. Entrepreneurial leadership vis-à-vis stakeholders 63-64 
Insights 64 
Food for thought section 64 
2. Compensation and CEO effectiveness 65-66 
Insights 66 
Food for thought section 67 
3. How integrity enables sustainable long-term performance 68-69 
Insights 70 
Food for thought section 70 
4. CEO: power, accountability and transparency 71-73 
Insights 73 
Food for thought section 73 
5. Media scrutiny and CEO effectiveness 74-75 
Insights 75 
Food for thought section 75 
6. Accountability and its limits: the Siemens case 76-77 
Insights 77 
Food for thought section 77 
Professors and Speakers 78 
  
CONCLUSIONS 79 
  
Board of Deans 80 
  
Contacts   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 vii 
FOREWORD 
 
 
A Global Alliance of Schools of Management  
 
COUNCIL ON BUSINESS AND SOCIETY  
 
Values 
 
he challenges are many. Business, society and the planet confronted with unprecedented 
change. The economic shift from West to East, re-occurring financial crisis, the acceleration 
in communication across frontiers and a growing scrutiny of business on both ethical and 
environmental levels present many risks but also great opportunity. Within this context, six of 
the world’s leading schools – ESSEC Business School; Keio Business School; School of 
Management, Fudan University; Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth; the University of 
Mannheim, Business School; and FGV-EAESP, Brazil – came together under a shared 
commitment and belief in the power of academic excellence, global outlook, innovation, 
business excellence, social responsibility, humanism and transformational leadership, to form 
the Council On Business And Society.  
 
Mission 
 
The Council’s mission is to create a multi-school process to study a series of critical issues 
facing business and society, organize international forums for dialogue and develop and 
disseminate educational materials and insights designed to foster continuing debate on the 
issues covered.  
 
The 1st Annual International Forum 2012 
 
Corporate Governance and Leadership in a Global World 
November 16-17, 2012 
Salons de la Maison des Arts et Métiers 
Paris, France 
 
The 1st Forum of the Council on Business and Society brought together leading academics, 
business leaders, students and policy-makers to form a multicultural, multi-level assembly of 
participants to cover the issues and insights around the theme of corporate governance and 
leadership. The output from this prestigious gathering supplies the basis for this White Paper 
that includes five chapters:  
 
 AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP 
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIETY 
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE 
 GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD 
 GOVERNANCE, THE CEO AND LEADERSHIP 
 
Each chapter includes analyses, recommendations for future developments, proposals for 
good practice, key subject Insights and Food for thought sections, as well as student survey 
contributions, focusing on both academic and operational matter for further reflection and 
transfer. 
 
 
T 
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Council on Business and Society Statements 
 
What is Corporate Governance?  
 
Many economists, especially in the Anglo-Saxon world, define Corporate Governance as the 
sum of economic, legal and organizational mechanisms (or forces) ensuring that 
corporations return funds to their outside investors. All other stakeholders, including 
employees and creditors, have legal protection beyond the governance system. 
 
Politicians, managers and also academics argue that Corporate Governance should not 
only be concerned about investors but also by creditors, employees, suppliers and consumers 
who all have a particular interest the way the company is run. 
 
Shareholders or Society? 
 
The opposition between the two may actually be mainly (only?) apparent. Trust in the long 
run viability of a company favors investment financing by creditors. Consideration and 
involvement of employees in corporate decisions induce companies to invest their human 
capital and enables them to attract and keep talented people. Building a strong reputation 
among suppliers and consumers improves the terms of trade and helps companies step back 
from crisis. This all is convergent with long-term performance and shareholders’ interests. 
 
From the many contributions of the Council, three focal points emerge from the Forum White 
Paper in this respect: 
 
Sense of ownership: Behaving as an owner means defending all shareholders’ interests, in 
particular the constituency of small minority shareholders who are the least protected.  
 
Transparency: Transparency contributes to trust, integrity and reputation. 
 
Long run view: Mechanisms targeting turning towards the long term must be implemented to 
compensate for short-term pressure from the media, short-term reporting and crisis 
management, etc. 
 
These focal points are implemented in different ways according to legal and cultural 
environments and the specificity of companies. They can take the form of appropriate rules 
for, among others, financial disclosure, CEO contracts, specific organizational forms, efficient 
selection of CEOs and directors, representation of employees on boards, engagement by 
long term investors and involvement of creditors to avoid excessive risk-taking. 
 
Leadership 
 
How do Corporate Governance mechanisms designed to ensure managerial accountability 
to stakeholders at the same time serve to unleash entrepreneurial initiates on the part of 
executives? CEOs and directors are obviously central for Corporate Governance. The CEO is 
the reference, must have a clear responsibility and lead by example. Being ultimately 
responsible before all stakeholders, the CEO is in a “very lonely” position, especially in times of 
crisis. In selecting the CEO, boards should consider both times of stability and times of crisis.  
 
Drawing on the insights and studies of leading academics, business and society experts and 
business leaders, as well as student contributions, the following White Paper will include 
numerous testimonies, analyses and case studies to support the Council on Business and 
Society Statements.  
 
                   Prof. Patricia Charléty, ESSEC Business School, 
                            Head of the Academic Committee  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
 
A context of change, crisis and pressure 
 
The interconnection of business and society 
has never been stronger, and the relationship 
between the two will continue to influence 
the global agenda in decades to come. 
 
Societal attitudes to business determine the 
ability to create wealth, to create jobs, and 
to act as a positive force for change. But the 
financial crisis and a series of corporate 
scandals have led many to question the role 
and values of business.  
 
Society’s trust in corporations and their 
executives is dismally low, with the crisis in 
leadership fuelled by a relentless media 
cycle and a growing consumer influence 
through the global spread of information and 
viewpoints over the internet.  
 
CEOs are scrutinized for their leadership and 
decision-making, boards are held 
accountable for the CEO’s remuneration, 
and companies are questioned about their 
sustainable strategy and social impact.  
 
The hidden gift 
 
But is this necessarily bad? The answer, 
despite the pressure this places on businesses 
and CEOs, must surely be no. For if the new 
world emerging through the current storm of 
change and crisis is one in which corporate 
governance builds not only business but also 
positively develops society while taking into 
account the environment, then such scrutiny 
can only be a wider form of positive 
governance in itself, there to remind 
businesses that they have a commitment to 
walking their talk.    
 
Corporate governance and leadership can 
find opportunity in the challenges it faces  
The daily demands on their time to cope with 
volatility and shocks, compliance, and an 
over-emphasis on quarterly results gives 
companies little time for sustainable value 
creation, and yet research reveals that 
organizations that focus on long-term 
 
performance perform better. For those 
companies who can successfully balance 
their short-term performance and long-term 
strategy, the 21st century will be filled with 
opportunity. Performance indicators such as 
employee satisfaction, innovation and brand 
health are fundamentals that will drive the 
performance of tomorrow’s enterprise, and it 
is essential for businesses to engage with all 
stakeholders, not just with shareholders, to 
address the question of trust. 
Equally, data shows that family-owned 
businesses have outperformed non-family 
companies over the last decade, which 
leads to the conclusion that boards should 
act and think like owners, thereby improving 
their effectiveness, their industry knowledge 
and their level of engagement.  
 
It is also time to look more closely at internal 
governance mechanisms, and the actors 
who bring these mechanisms into play: only 
excellence in governance will restore the 
trust of society. 
 
The cultural perspective 
This might hold true for developed markets in 
Europe and North America, but from an 
emerging economy perspective, the 
question is more likely to be Does corporate 
governance matter?  
 
The debate over how companies are 
governed is as old as companies themselves. 
Corporate codes of governance, on the 
other hand, have developed more recently, 
many of them in the wake of various 
corporate scandals of the 1990s. With over 
100 international codes and regulations that 
often focus on issues of shareholder rights, 
financial transparency, accuracy of 
disclosure, and accountability of the board, 
their interpretation varies from one country to 
another. 
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Governance and leadership oriented 
towards the wider perspective 
With the assertion that businesses have to 
make profit in order to create wealth, the 
way in which businesses are governed, and 
the relationships between management, the 
board, shareholders and outside stakeholders 
impacts on many of the challenges faced by 
society as a whole. The purpose of 
corporations therefore is more than just 
maximizing profits and wealth; the well-being 
of all stakeholders should be considered. 
Towards a governance mindset of 
collaboration, diversity and communication 
The biggest test of corporate governance in 
any culture has been when things go wrong, 
such as bankruptcy or takeovers and the 
subsequent conflicts of interest between the 
board, workers, creditors and shareholders. 
 
So how can businesses limit those conflicts of 
interest? Our suggestion is that governance 
should pursue an integrative approach, 
encouraging people to work more closely 
together - managers discussing with 
employees, shareholders collaborating with 
the board - to take into consideration all 
points of view, not just financial ones. Further, 
corporate boards will benefit from having a 
diversity of perspectives, which includes a 
higher percentage of female board 
members, and greater employee 
representation. 
 
Good governance is not about rules - it’s 
about people 
While most corporate governance 
conferences focus on shareholders and 
boards, few focus on the critical role of the 
CEO. The intense scrutiny of the media often 
overlooks the complexity of being a CEO, 
and how his or her decisions are impacted by 
the environment in which they operate. 
Context is very important for those decisions, 
and brings with it a better understanding of 
their leadership.  
The idea of close cooperation is often met 
with skepticism, but this is in part a 
communication gap that influences public 
perception, and it is only through putting the 
human aspect back into the governance  
equation that businesses can find a common 
language with society. 
A good board can never compensate for a 
bad CEO but a good CEO can compensate 
for a bad board. In this light, effective 
leadership must anchor its behaviour in 
values that set example and provide stability 
in times of crisis, among them the essential 
three of integrity, transparency and 
accountability. The latter are critical for good 
governance and more effective capital 
markets, as well as providing investors with 
visibility on matters such as remuneration and 
giving investors, and moreover rating 
agencies, more information with which to 
make decisions.  
 
Ultimately, when companies take the 
initiative be it on issues of diversity or 
transparency, it pre-empts activism among 
shareholders, and avoids the introduction of 
onerous legislation and rules. 
The business leaders of the future 
Providing input to this White Paper, student 
respondents from across the world ranked 
environmental protection highest as the 
challenge in which business should be 
involved. There was also agreement that a 
company’s board of directors should have 
the most influence over CEO decisions and, 
in addition, well over half the students 
agreed or strongly agreed that government 
legislation is essential to ensure a balance 
between business interests and society. These 
attitudes among future business leaders are 
consistent with movement in the last 10 years 
towards a greater interest in ethics and social 
responsibility. Indeed, it is the moral courage 
that our students will learn at business school 
that can encourage them to stand up and 
question behavior in order to positively shape 
the interconnection of business and society 
of the future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
AN OVERVIEW OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND LEADERSHIP 
 
“Ethics in business is extremely important; your reputation is all you have in life.” 
 
Sir Freddie Laker 
 
n a context of unprecedented change that has seen the economic shift of balance from 
West to East, financial crises and the impact of instant global communication, corporate 
governance and leadership have risen to the forefront in providing business and society with 
a compass setting offering clear direction towards stable haven.   
 
Eroded trust, the pressures of short-term performance, limited resources and stretched 
productivity are only a few of the challenges ahead. We explore the wider context and 
provide an overview of developing not only business but also society in a positive way 
through making effective business decisions, strengthening the role of the leader and 
implementing effective governance. 
 
Two analyses: 
 
 What are the challenges for doing business in the 21st century? 
                                             
 Governance and leadership at crossroads. 
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1. What are the challenges for doing business in 
the 21st century?  
Mr. Eric Labaye, Director McKinsey & Co. 
 
he last twenty years have seen unprecedented changes,” insists Eric Labaye, Director of 
McKinsey & Co. and chairman of the McKinsey Global Institute. Since 1990, China has 
grown from 3 to 4% of world GDP to 14% today, the G7 has evolved into the G20 and the 
World Wide Web, which barely existed two decades ago, now connects billions of people 
around the world. Despite economic crisis, living standards have risen and hundreds of 
millions of people have been lifted out of poverty. 
Eric Labaye draws from MGI (McKinsey Global Institute) research to look at the fundamental 
trends that are reshaping the global economy, as well as the key challenges for business and 
their implications for leadership and governance. 
 
 
Eric Labaye identifies 
5 mega-trends affecting 
the global economy 
 
 
 The great rebalancing of East and West 
 Productivity challenges 
 Interconnectivity and the global grid 
 Resources and pricing the planet 
 Increasing demands on governments 
 
 
The great rebalancing of East and West 
The focus of economic power is shifting as 50% of GDP growth in the next decade will come 
from emerging markets with key drivers being demographics and urbanization. 
 
Productivity challenges 
For developed countries, especially Europe, productivity has been declining, while an aging 
population is being supported by a proportionally smaller workforce. Indeed, a key issue is a 
mismatch in the skills of the labor force and the skills required by employers. 
Interconnectivity and the global grid 
The world is connected by trade, capital and especially information flows. Moreover, 
interconnectivity has led to the creation of virtual communities and has changed the entire 
ecosystem of the global economy. 
Resources and pricing the planet 
Over the past decade, commodity prices have increased dramatically and projections for 
the future show marked gaps between supply and demand in water, energy and food. In 
response to these gaps, strategies to deploy would include improving productivity and 
efficiency, as well as finding alternatives. In the words of Eric Labaye, “there is unlimited 
demand for limited resources.” 
 
Increasing demands on governments 
With aging populations, governments are facing increasing demands in areas such as health 
care and retirement as well as productivity challenges where new ways to increase output 
while lowering costs must be found. Confronted with these major trends, more than half of 
the CEOs surveyed by MGI say they are going to face a major business model transformation. 
For Eric Labaye, there are five key challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. 
T 
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How significant will the impact be on business? 
 
The trends of the past 20 years are likely to last through at least the next decade. Key 
implications of these trends for businesses include:  
 
Sources of growth in large companies: Choosing which markets to enter, both in 
geographical and product category terms, is a company’s most important strategic decision 
affecting growth. Moreover, there are many opportunities, and executives must decide 
which ones to pursue and how to execute their plan. 
New opportunities for innovators: In order to compete in emerging markets, innovation is 
essential. However, innovation is changing, resulting in the need to learn from local markets 
and adapt accordingly, or use different business models employing new technologies such 
as cloud computing. 
Managing a global organization: Leaders of global organizations face challenges attracting 
both the best talent and creating a collaborative culture as well as leading organizations that 
perform effectively both internally and with external suppliers and innovation chains. MGI 
surveys reveal that the organizational effectiveness of global companies is currently lower 
than that of local companies, which provides food for thought that being global is a 
penalizing factor. 
Being able to leverage data: The amount of data available in the interconnected world has 
exploded offering a potential opportunity to generate significant financial value across 
business sectors. It is in businesses’ interests to want to take advantage of this data but they 
require skilled individuals who can do so. 
Raising resource productivity: As resources become more costly and constrained, companies 
- especially those that need resources for buildings (i.e. electricity) or transportation (i.e. gas) - 
must think differently in order to use these resources more efficiently. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
So what are the implications for leadership and governance? 
Recognizing the issue of eroded trust in business - linked both to the financial crisis, and also 
the impact of globalization on society – Eric Labaye returns to the premise of the father of 
modern economics, Adam Smith, who argued that you couldn’t have a successful business 
and not a prosperous society. Two hundred and fifty years later, the responsibility of 
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entrepreneurs remains to develop their business while also ensuring that society develops in a 
positive way. 
The implications are fourfold: Firstly, Eric Labaye suggests that leadership will need to manage 
volatility, leading with both a telescope and a microscope. “We have mega trends that will 
shape the next 20 years, and at the same time there are many shocks - commodity prices, 
geopolitical events, and trade discussions - so taking a telescope view is important for 
leaders. But he acknowledges that the microscope view can take 150% of a CEO’s time, with 
a frequently occurring question that of how they can find enough time to think about the 
long term, skills and getting the right team.  
Indeed, the balance between the two is a key challenge, with CEOs having to make your 
way through the volatility while still being able to deliver for the long term. Linked to this is the 
conclusion that there is an over emphasis on quarterly results, when stakeholders should in 
fact be taking a 10-year view. 
While performance is both short and long-term, there is also the health of the organization to 
consider, with indicators of long term performance such as employee satisfaction, the 
pipeline of new products and brand health constituting the fundamentals of the organization 
that will drive the long-term performance and long-term value creation of the business 
tomorrow. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McKinsey & Company 
MGI research reveals that organizations that focus on long-term health perform better. 
Evidence also suggests that businesses should engage with all stakeholders - not just with 
shareholders - to address the question of trust. Companies such as Alcoa now have a 
systematic process for partnering with customers, suppliers, employees, public agencies, 
NGOs and local communities, as well as shareholders and creditors. 
But perhaps the most striking data shows that family-owned businesses have outperformed 
non-family companies over the last decade, which leads him to conclude that boards should 
act and think like owners. 
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Source: McKinsey & Company 
This entails thinking about the long-term view for performance and health, the issue being not 
one or the other, but one AND the other. The key message here is that sense of ownership 
can help improve boards’ effectiveness, their industry knowledge and their level of 
engagement.  
Despite the frustration that board members may feel over spending 80% of their time on 
compliance issues and only 20% on strategy, committing more time to the long-term will 
ultimately help redress the balance. 
The challenges of a globalizing world place a tremendous burden on companies and their 
business models, but for those companies who can successfully balance their short-term 
performance and long-term strategy, the 21st century will be filled with opportunity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: McKinsey & Company 
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“Sense of ownership can help improve 
boards’ effectiveness, knowledge and level 
of engagement.” 
                                           Eric Labaye 
 
 
Student Survey findings 
In our global society, what are the most important 
challenges businesses should be involved in? Top 3 
student rankings: 
1. Environmental protection 
2. Energy availability/efficiency 
3. Labor issues 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Sense of ownership can help improve the board’s effectiveness, its 
industry knowledge and its level of engagement. 
 Indicators of long run performance include employee satisfaction, the 
pipeline of new products, brand health. 
 Companies should engage not only with shareholders but with all 
stakeholders. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ In terms of your leadership and governance, what can you do to strengthen the 
     capacity to manage volatility, find balance between the short- and long-term, and instill 
     the positive outcomes of having an owner mindset? 
2/ What action and opportunities for your organization lie ahead with respect to growth, 
      innovation, global reach, leveraging data and raising resources productivity?   
3/ How do you see your organisation weathering the 5 “mega-trends” affecting the global 
     economy? 
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2.  Governance and leadership at a crossroads 
 
 
                                                                               Professor Patricia Charléty, ESSEC Business School 
   Professor Atsuomi Obayashi, Keio Business 
School 
Dr. Werner Brandt, CFO, SAP AG 
Mr. Alain Champigneux, Employee Elected Board Member, Renault 
Professor Katsunori Mikuniya, University of Tokyo; 
 Former Commissioner, Financial Services Agency of Japan 
Mr. Thierry Peugeot, Chairman, Supervisory Board, Peugeot SA 
 
nly excellence in governance will overcome the current crisis of confidence in 
leadership with the reaching of a tipping point where corporate governance drives 
corporate strategy rather than the inverse.   
Walking the talk? 
For Dr. Werner Brandt, CFO of SAP, this is the only way for companies to regain the trust they 
need to operate successfully: Leaders today care about corporate governance because it 
aims to secure not just what the company does, but also how it acts. The crossroads we have 
reached – as a result of ongoing erosion in trust – is that corporate governance has become 
a central leadership topic. 
 
“Leaders today care about corporate 
governance because it aims to secure not 
just what the company does, but also how it 
acts.” 
                                           Dr. Werner Brandt 
 
The spectacular failures in governance of the late 90s and early 2000s have clearly driven the 
decline in trust in business and the parallel rise in the importance of corporate governance, 
further fuelled by excessive risk taking in the recent financial crisis. However, Professor 
Katsunori Mikuniya of the University of Tokyo and former Commissioner of the Financial 
Services Agency of Japan reminds us of the importance of achieving a balance between 
healthy risk taking and regulation. In practicing good governance, organizations must ensure 
that they continue to be innovative and entrepreneurial while avoiding the taking of 
excessive risks. 
Does audit include image? 
Companies can no longer rely on audit, compliance, legislation and accounting to ensure 
good governance. The massive government bailouts of banks and car makers have already 
led to additional regulation - the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III being prominent examples - 
and Dr. Brandt believes there is likelihood for more to come, also identifying a more subtle 
factor contributing to the issue related to the increase in the power of the individual.  
Up until recently, a company was almost only judged by whether it was financially healthy 
and followed the law. Today, companies such as SAP are also measured by whether they are 
sustainable, if employees are happy and diverse, and if the company contributes positively 
to society. In other words, far more stakeholders beyond the shareholder determine the 
measures of success.   
Technology has powered this trend, enabling stakeholders to exert influence to an extent 
that was impossible just a few years ago. Consumers, employees, NGOs and the general 
public have far more ability today to analyze, compare, make decisions and publicly express 
their opinion than ever before. The ability of a disgruntled United Airlines passenger to 
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generate 12 million page views for a song posted on YouTube about his damaged guitar - 
and arguably trigger a 10 percent drop in the company’ share price - is one of many 
examples of the increasingly significant voice of stakeholders. In short, governance matters 
more than ever. 
So what does this mean for corporate governance?  
 
Dr. Werner Brandt  
identifies the requirement 
to focus on the 3 Cs 
 
 Compliance 
 Comprehensive governance 
 Communication 
 
Compliance: Companies must be fully compliant with all rules and regulations, with zero 
tolerance for missteps in this area. 
Comprehensive governance: Companies can no longer concentrate on reporting and 
governing primarily for shareholders, but have to balance this more strongly with the interests 
of employees, customers, and the general public. At SAP, this approach is reflected in the 
four corporate objectives used to steer the company and set goals for everyone – including 
the board. They are: revenue, operating profit, employee engagement and customer loyalty. 
In addition, key leaders carry targets related to the public image and reputation of the 
company. 
Communication: Companies must communicate more openly about their corporate 
governance activities and about those topics that matter to all stakeholders. With this in 
mind, SAP communicates 2012 performance and beyond in one integrated report and 
indeed, the company will no longer be publishing an annual financial report along with a 
separate sustainability report and any number of smaller additional statements.  
The well-being of all stakeholders 
Excellence in governance has also called into question the traditional view that the sole 
objective of a corporation is to maximize profits. Thierry Peugeot, Chairman of the Supervisory 
Board at Europe’s second largest carmaker Peugeot SA, argues that the well-being of all 
stakeholders should be considered. While businesses have to make profits in order to create 
wealth, the way in which businesses are governed, and the relationships between 
management, the board, shareholders and outside stakeholders impacts on many 
challenges faced by society as a whole.  
 
“I do not believe that companies exist just 
to make profit or maximize wealth.” 
                                           Thierry Peugeot 
 
Professor Patricia Charléty of ESSEC Business School suggests an integrative approach, 
encouraging people to work more closely together - managers discussing with employees, 
shareholders collaborating with the board - to take into consideration not only the financial 
point of view but indeed the views of all those concerned. In this way, corporate boards 
benefit from having a diversity of perspectives, including a higher percentage of female 
board members, and greater employee representation.  
The idea of a ‘dream team’ board of Directors, composed in the interest of both the 
company and its stakeholders is an idea raised by Alain Champigneux, Employee Elected 
Board Member at Renault. He suggests that the board should of course include directors 
specialized in finance, but also comprise managers from other companies, directors whose 
qualifications are in line with the firm’s activities, and also employees who he sees as essential 
stakeholders contributing to the success of the company. 
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Student Survey findings 
What responsibilities do companies have in today’s 
world? Top 3 student rankings: 
1. Maximizing value for shareholders 
2. Satisfying customer needs 
3. Creating value for the communities in which 
they operate 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 
 Financial health and compliance are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for long-term performance and sustainability. 
 Society (including employees, consumers, NGOs, etc.) now has the 
ability to analyze and publicly communicate its analysis. 
 Corporate governance is comprehensive and balances the interests of 
shareholders with all stakeholders. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
 
1/ To what extent are your organization’s culture and behaviors driven by effective corporate 
    governance? What are (would be) the outcomes? What are the objectives assigned to 
    the board?    
2/ What effect would strengthening governance through the SAP example have on your 
     customers? On your suppliers?   
3/ How do (could) employees as stakeholders contribute to the health of your organization? 
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 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND SOCIETY 
 
 
“A business that makes nothing but money is a poor kind of business” 
 
Henry Ford 
 
he Council on Business and Society advocates a wider, deeper role for corporate 
governance as serving the interests of business, shareholders, stakeholders and the wider 
perspective of society itself. The following chapter demonstrates the positive effects of 
government legislation and influence on corporate governance, highlights the impact of 
dualism and voluntary codes of governance and finally, provides a set of effective proposals 
for the shape of governance to come.  
 
Three perceptions:  
 
 The economic context: Corporate governance - Strongly needed but effective 
     only if market governance and long-termism prevail 
 The cultural context: Corporate governance - The German answer to a global issue 
 The legislative context: Governance and the role of government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
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1. The economic context: Corporate 
  governance - Strongly needed but 
  effective only if market governance and 
  long-termism prevail 
                            
Mr. Pierre Bollon, Executive Officer, French Asset Management Association 
 
 
 fundamental shift is underway in the world economy which requires both change and 
adaptation. In this new era, corporate governance will increase in importance. 
Understanding the essential role of governance, the French Asset Management Association 
has focused on the exercising of voting rights by asset managers, devising a corporate 
governance code and monitoring the governance of France’s major companies. However, 
although improvement has been made in governance structure and practice, even more is 
required if organizations are to effectively champion the change ahead. 
  
Can corporate governance help ride out the sea change?  
 
While economies in Europe are seemingly in a period of autumn and may well be heading 
towards winter, many individuals and governments remain hopeful that spring and summer 
will return. Some believe Europe’s financial crisis was inevitable and are even surprised it 
didn’t happen sooner given the context in which greed, short termism and addiction to debt 
were underlying influences. Initially, access to debt actually delayed this crisis as innovative 
finance instruments hid the difficulties that existed. Eventually, lenders said “enough” with the 
result that the world is now going through the sometimes painful experience of deleveraging.   
 
Pierre Bollon, however, does not foresee a cyclical economic process, with a typical spring or 
summer. He sees an entirely new era. Firms will have to change and adapt and difficult 
decisions must be made, requiring courage. In this process, corporate governance will be of 
the utmost importance. 
 
 
“This is a sea change for the world 
economy. Things post-crisis will be different.” 
                                           Pierre Bollon 
 
What role has the French Asset Management Association played in governance changes? 
 
Comprising 500 small and entrepreneurial to large firms that manage 2.6 billion Euros, The 
Association recognizes the importance of corporate governance and has taken several steps 
to strengthen it:  
 
Encouraging the exercising of voting rights 
Many French companies were once characterized as having absentee owners and in this 
light, 15 years ago or so, the Association created a governance committee that 
recommended asset managers exercise their voting rights. It is important to stress that this 
recommendation was not so much driven by asset managers’ clients – who indeed, were not 
demanding such a step – but on asset managers seeing it as their fiduciary duty to be more 
engaged in governance and voting despite this representing a cost in following companies 
more closely in order to form clear decisions when voting. 
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Formulating a corporate governance code 
This established what asset managers should expect from companies in which they invest 
including concepts such as one share, one vote, opposition to poison pills and significant 
representation on a board among independent directors. 
 
Establishing a monitoring system 
This involves assessing the governance of France’s 120 largest companies and notifying 
Association members if the governance at these companies is contrary to the code. These 
steps have been a huge success, with increasing numbers of asset managers attending 
annual meetings, engaging in a dialogue with the firms they own, voting their shares and at 
times voting against firm resolutions.  
 
Further systemic changes are needed to consolidate improvements in how organizations 
manage governance 
 
While considerable progress has been made in strengthening corporate governance in 
France, other important areas requiring focus are say-on-pay and more director education. 
In looking beyond improving governance for individual companies, there are several 
additional areas where governance in the wider perspective needs to be improved: 
 
 
An owner mindset 
 
Deleveraging 
 
Norms 
 
Financial firms 
 
Greater market 
governance 
 
Focusing on ESG 
 
 Asset managers and shareholders must behave as owners, 
with a long-term focus 
 
 Deleveraging must occur, with debt becoming less 
important, and bondholders must have a voice 
 
 Global accounting norms should be adopted 
 
 
 Determinations should be made regarding whether 
special governance is needed for financial firms 
 
 Greater market governance is required. Markets have 
been liberalized, perhaps too much. More regulation may 
be needed to ensure properly functioning markets 
 
 Both companies and markets must focus on ESG: 
Environmental, Social and corporate Governance. 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 
 Good corporate governance builds on good financial markets 
governance. 
 Asset managers should behave more as owners, engage and vote their 
shares appropriately.  
 Creditors’ should have a voice to prevent excessive risk-taking which is 
detrimental to society. 
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 As companies, asset owners should integrate non-financial issues. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ To what extent do the benefits for your organization and its customers lie in the active 
      involvement of asset managers?      
2/ What effect would having a corporate code of ethics and governance have on your 
     organisation and its stakeholders?   
3/ To what extent is your business and, to a wider extent, your sector focused on 
      environmental, social and corporate governance? What are the short- and long-term 
      benefits of ESG for you and your business sector?   
4/ For asset managers and analysts: To what extent are/should financial and non-financial  
      reporting be analyzed by the same analyst? 
5/ Companies: to what extent should the financial and non-financial reports be integrated? 
6/ For the regulator: to what extent/how should creditors have a voice in corporate 
      governance? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  25 
2.   The cultural context: Corporate governance - 
  The German answer to a global issue 
                            
Dr. Götz Schmidt-Bremme, Chief, Economic Affairs, German Embassy of Paris 
    Professor Klaus-Peter Müller, Chairman, Supervisory Board of Commerzbank AG; 
Chairman, Government Commission on the German Corporate Governance Code 
 
 
o increase Germany’s companies and capital markets attractiveness to investors, its 
corporate governance code establishes both standards and 90 recommendations for 
good governance. Stakeholder-oriented in nature, they emphasize underlying principles of a 
social market economy such as transparency and sustainability. Compliance is voluntary 
(though non-compliance requires an explanation), providing companies with flexibility, and in 
all evidence, the governance code, along with Germany’s dualistic board structure, has 
worked well for the country, creating a vibrant, entrepreneurial business climate that is 
respected across the globe. 
 
A dualistic structure is a defining characteristic of German business, and has proven quite 
successful 
 
Most countries have a one-tier corporate structure, with one governing board that is often 
controlled by members of management. In contrast, explains Professor Müller, Chairman of 
the Supervisory Board at Commerzbank AG, Germany requires two boards: a management 
board that operates the enterprise and a supervisory board that oversees and advises the 
management board. These two boards are completely separate and independent, with 
supervisory boards increasingly involved in strategic planning.  
 
A convergence is occurring between countries with one-tier boards and those with dualistic 
structures. Increasingly, countries with one-tier structures are separating the CEO and 
chairman roles or are appointing an independent lead director. Both approaches can work 
and the dualistic approach has proven successful in Germany. 
 
Germany’s voluntary code on corporate governance helps strengthen Germany’s businesses 
 
10 years ago, a government commission was formed in Germany to develop a corporate 
governance code and standards for listed German companies. The purpose of this code was 
to increase the attractiveness of Germany’s companies and capital markets to international 
investors, as well as taking into account all stakeholder groups and including 90 
recommendations on the rights and duties of management and supervisory boards. These 
deal with topics including the management board’s duty to provide information to the 
supervisory board and its independence. Importantly, companies have no legal obligation to 
follow these recommendations; voluntary in nature, boards must, however, indicate in the 
Declaration of Conformity if the recommendations have been followed and explain when 
they have not. 
 
 
“Companies don’t have to obey the 
German Corporate Governance Code; 
they do have to explain.” 
                     Professor Klaus-Peter Müller 
 
The code is flexible, with deviations from it being both legally admissible and sometimes 
necessary. Such deviations are not automatically considered an expression of bad 
governance, the essential point being that there has to be an explanation when there are 
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deviations. This clause ultimately provides transparency to the capital markets in order for the 
markets to draw their conclusions. 
 
A stakeholder orientation has become an accepted practice for German companies 
 
The German Corporate Governance Code has a stakeholder orientation that goes beyond 
just the interests of shareholders in maximizing profits. The approach of the code conveys the 
obligation of management and supervisory boards to act in accordance with the principles 
of a social market economy. Ethics, sustainability and avoidance of excessive risk are all 
important.  
 
 
“Management boards are responsible for 
managing the enterprise in the interests of 
stakeholders; they have an obligation not 
just to shareholders but to society.” 
                             Professor Klaus-Peter Müller 
 
Transparency is critical for good governance 
 
To make capital markets work effectively, the solution is not increased regulation. What is 
indeed needed is even greater transparency which provides investors with visibility on matters 
such as remuneration and gives investors more information with which to make decisions. 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Good corporate Governance relies on more transparency, not more 
regulation. 
 “Comply or explain”: deviations from the code’s recommendations 
should be allowed provided companies explain. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ Is a dualistic structure of governance (Board of Management and Board of Overseers) 
     viable for both small and large companies alike? What are the pros and cons?       
2/ To what extent does your organisation work within a voluntary environment for 
     governance? Does regulation help or hinder?     
3/  To what extent is transparency also a leadership quality?  
4/  For the regulator: should more flexibility be introduced in the choice of the Board Structure 
     (example of France where companies can opt for the monist or dualistic structure). 
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3. The legislative context: Governance and the 
   role of government 
 
Professor Sridar Arcot, ESSEC Business School 
Professor Rodrigo Bandeira de Mello, Fundação Getulio Vargas, EAESP 
Mr. Mats Isaksson, Head of Corporate Affairs Department, OECD 
 
overnment policies definitely affect corporate governance, for policies and their 
enforcement shape the environment for corporations. Professors Sridar Arcot, Rodrigo 
Bandeira de Mello and Mr Mats Isaksson of the OECD explore various policy frameworks, 
each of which has benefits and shortcomings, with the conclusion that there is not a one-size-
fits-all approach to policy or governance, though the desire among companies for flexibility 
must be balanced by the need for investors of disclosure transparency. As experience in 
Brazil shows, especially in developing markets, the government is not just a policymaker; it 
may be a partner, a lender and even an owner. 
 
How do governments create conditions for companies to grow?  
 
For Matts Isaksson, there is no doubt that the government plays a role in governance and the 
OECD has developed a set of corporate governance guidelines whose purpose focuses on 
economic efficiency which in turn drives economic growth. This is achieved when companies 
can access capital and sell equity which they then use for growth. For investors to invest amid 
uncertainty requires laws on corporate governance and the stock market that include rules 
relating to transparency and disclosure. 
 
 
“Company law and the stock market 
provide an ability for companies to access 
risk capital for growth.” 
                                        Mats Isaksson 
 
However, the rules that exist in many countries may be based on an antiquated financial 
view of the world. These rules assume that shareholders have a direct view and interest in a 
company, which today is often not the case due to the rise of institutional investors and 
middlemen. Other notable changes in the market include market fragmentation and use of 
trading techniques such as indexing and ETFs and it is due to these new realities that the 
OECD will be reassessing its guidelines for corporate governance at a future date. 
 
What impact does allowing voluntary disclosure have on companies? 
  
In the UK in the early 1990s, the Cadbury Committee developed a code of corporate 
governance best practices. Compliance with this code was voluntary, but if companies did 
not comply they were expected to explain the reason for not doing so. Within the UK and 
around the world, this approach gradually took off. Among the code’s best practices are 
separating the chairman and CEO roles; appointing a senior, nonexecutive director; having 
one third of directors as non-executives; having a CEO service contract of not more than one 
year; and creating committees in areas such as audit, remuneration and nomination. 
Professor Arcot’s research shows voluntary compliance in the UK has risen steadily and now 
exceeds 60%, though among firms that haven’t complied, many offer no explanation for their 
non-compliance. When explanations are provided, they tend to be general and are rarely 
specific, which may be acceptable for family firms where the family can be expected to 
closely monitor its investment, but problematic for widely held companies where investors 
want to monitor the firm but lack the information to do so. In Professor Arcot’s view, corporate 
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governance is complex and there is not a one-size-fits-all solution, believing it good practice 
to provide companies flexibility in deciding which practices to adopt based on their situation, 
but seeing drawbacks in a purely volunteer compliance system where there is weak legal 
protection for investors in widely held companies. In this light, governments need to attribute 
further thought to those circumstances requiring more compliance or explanation. 
 
Brazil’s experience shows that the government is more than just a regulator 
 
Professor Bandeira de Mello explains that in developing markets such as Brazil, the 
government often plays a greater role than simply establishing rules. In Brazil, the government 
has always had a close link with the private sector, both embracing the market and enacting 
policies to help the country develop. Furthermore, the government has acted as a legislator, 
a lender and an owner of companies and controls or influences many of the resources that 
firms need, affects issues such as licensing and often has influence regarding the naming of 
CEOs and directors. The idea of government playing a “blurred role” is not limited to Brazil 
however. In many countries, the government plays a key role in supporting industries or 
companies, providing access to capital, deciding on executives and directors and deciding 
upon regulations, thereby actively contributing to the impact on corporate governance.  
 
 
 
Student Survey findings 
Government legislation is essential to ensure a balance 
between business interests and society: 
Disagree: 17% 
Agree: 67% 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Transparency and disclosure are important for protecting investors, 
promoting economic efficiency and growth in the interest of society. 
 Rules should be adapted to acknowledge the rise of institutional 
shareholders and middlemen who are not the ultimate owners of 
companies. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ To what extent does your organisation work within a voluntary environment for 
      governance? Does regulation help or hinder?     
2/   To what extent is transparency also a leadership quality?  
3/ Regulator: Given the diversity of companies, what are the respective benefits of 
      mandatory compliance or flexibility? 
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 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE 
 
“The real measure of your wealth is how much you'd be worth if you lost all your money” 
 
Anonymous  
 
n times of change and crisis, a mark of stability becomes a basis for reassurance and trust. In 
this context, bondholders and rating agencies are attributing greater importance to 
corporate governance as a means to measure a company’s soundness, and while private 
equity has performed solidly throughout the past few years, it suffers from a poor public 
image that effective governance may be able to improve. A final pillar of stability is 
anchored in shareholder power and active engagement, where shareholder meetings may 
take on the role of a governance event.  
 
Five studies:     
  
 Corporate bond financing, credit risk, ratings and governance 
 Audit and optimal financial  disclosures 
 Private equity investments, value creation and social consequences 
 Shareholder power and responsibilities + Engagement policies with active institutional 
investors (view of large shareholders) 
 Trends in board leadership and shareholder engagement policies. 
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1. Corporate Bond Financing, Credit Risk, 
Ratings and Governance 
Professor Patricia Langohr, ESSEC Business School 
Professor Chao Chen, School of Management, Fudan University 
    Mr. Blaise Ganguin, Head of Corporate Ratings 
     - EMEA & Managing Director, Standard & Poor's 
  Professor Katsunori Mikuniya, University of Tokyo; Former 
               Commissioner, Financial Services Agency of Japan 
 
reditors are another important group of stakeholders who care about a firm’s stability 
and who look to ratings agencies to provide critical risk information. Increasingly, 
bondholders and ratings agencies are considering corporate governance as a factor in 
assessing companies and in times of rapid change, governance, vision and the leadership 
provided by CEOs and directors are even more important. 
Where have the creditors gone? 
Professor Chao Chen of the Fudan University School of Management states that in many 
discussions on governance, stakeholders are typically defined as shareholders, employees, 
customers, and the community. However, there is little or no mention of creditors, and no 
discussion of a firm’s obligation to its creditors. This is problematic given that creditors - who 
are often investors that purchase bonds - play a key role for many firms and are a critical 
stakeholder. While managers are often focused on short-term earnings, on the other hand 
creditors care about a firm’s credit rating, its credit risk and the probability of default. The 
conclusion is that corporate governance is beneficial for both shareholders and bondholders. 
For ratings agencies, corporate governance is also an important consideration in assessing 
companies 
Mr. Blaise Ganguin, Head of Corporate Ratings - EMEA & Managing Director, Standard & 
Poor's, confirms that governance is definitely taken into account by S&P when developing 
ratings, indicating that over recent years, S&P has tightened its methodology in assessing 
governance. This assessment involves looking at the culture of a company’s management to 
assess if managers behave as long-term owners or if they act in self-interest. S&P expects 
companies to have good governance de rigueur and therefore does not provide positive 
marks for governance: it is considered either “neutral” or “negative.”  
Governance in times of crisis 
Having witnessed two financial crises in Japan - in the early 1980s and again in 2008 - 
Professor Mikuniya of the University of Tokyo asserts that corporate governance is particularly 
important in rapidly changing situations. 
 
“Decisions about governance made in 
times of stability determine future winners 
and losers.” 
                           Professor Katsunori Mikuniya 
 
In Professor Mikuniya’s experience, companies that exhibit good governance during a crisis 
focus on governance during times of stability, which in effect readied the company for a 
crisis. He also believes that strength and stability in a crisis comes from a clear corporate vision 
and philosophy that includes a long- term focus and an emphasis on ethics.  
 
C 
  32 
Governance in times of change 
The CEO and board also have critical roles, according to Mikuniya, because when structural 
change is large and rapid, the CEO becomes more important. Sound governance starts with 
the CEO and the board: they must have vision, be able to forecast economic conditions and 
make good decisions and although contributions are needed from all stakeholders, the 
contribution of the CEO is particularly important. Good governance involves balancing 
‘virtuous combinations’ - risk taking while controlling risk, bold actions along with financial 
security. 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 
 Creditors are concerned with the long run viability of the company and 
may counter-balance those managers focused on short-term earnings 
and taking excessive risk. 
 Companies exhibiting good governance during a crisis also exhibited 
good governance in times of stability (in Japan). 
 The role of the CEO is particularly critical in times of crisis. 
 The vision and leadership of the CEO are important factors to assess the 
long term health of a company. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ Should the firm have more obligations to the creditors who are sometimes also investors 
    (bondholders)? When? How? 
2/ Is the same governance (CEO, board) appropriate for times of stability and of crisis?  
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2. Audit and optimal financial  disclosures 
 
Dr. Werner Brandt, CFO, SAP AG 
Professor Holger Daske, University of Mannheim, Business School 
Professor Yasuhiro Ohta, Keio Business School 
 
ver the past decade accounting scandals have led to a flood of financial disclosure 
regulations. A hope among global businesses is for one set of accounting standards 
around the world. However, to date, countries have had different levels of oversight, 
enforcement and compliance due to different types of regulatory institutions. It has been said 
that in many countries stronger institutions are needed, but ultimately, producing complete 
and accurate financial statements is the obligation of management. Best practices involve 
delegating responsibility to the audit committee, which in turn works closely with the firm’s 
independent external auditor. 
 
Providing accurate and complete financial information is an obligation of management 
 
The starting point for thinking about financial reporting is recognizing that it is the obligation of 
management to provide accurate and complete financial information for the market. At 
SAP, the management committee and the supervisory board created financial guidelines 
and established five layers of oversight. The supervisory board delegated responsibility to the 
audit committee for pulling together the information for the financial reports, with the audit 
committee then engaging the firm’s independent auditor. The audit committee and the 
external auditor developed best practices that guide how they work together. 
 
 
“An effective audit requires cooperation 
between the audit committee and the 
external auditor.” 
                                        Dr. Werner Brandt 
 
Among best practices guiding the relationship between the audit committee and the 
external auditor are alignment of the audit committee with the company’s strategy; full 
transparency with the auditor regarding strategy and operations; and a report by the auditor 
regarding the company’s internal controls. In addition, the auditor is involved in all meetings 
of the audit committee and there is a seamless flow of information between the audit 
committee and the auditor. 
 
As businesses become more global, they should be linked by one set of accounting 
standards 
 
Professor Daske states that as businesses are increasingly global, one idea is to create a 
common set of accounting standards. However, this is currently far from a reality. For 
example, in Japan, about 1% of public companies use IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards), another 1% uses the U.S. version of GAAP and 98% use local Japanese GAAP.  
 
 
“We need alignment of capital markets 
regulation.” 
 
                                    Professor Yasuhiro Ohta 
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In practice, alignment requires more 
than just common standards. Even 
when countries adopt standards such 
as IFRS, there often are significant 
differences in how reporting occurs. This 
is because of: 
 
 Incentives  
 Lack of institutions  
 Lack of compliance 
 
 
Incentives 
Despite standards, actual reporting practices are driven by incentives and company 
choices. 
 
Lack of institutions 
Many countries lack strong institutions to ensure that standards are translated into practice. 
While the SEC has existed in the U.S. for more than 70 years, Germany has only had a 
comparable institution for five years. In Europe, institutions to enforce standards are often 
weak and lack resources.  
 
Lack of compliance 
As a result of weak institutions, there are issues with the compliance and enforcement of 
these standards. Professor Daske notes that audit checklists are not thoroughly followed, and 
while 100% of U.S. banks comply with mandated regulations, perhaps only 50% of banks 
outside of the U.S. comply. Moreover, even when compliance with regulation is lacking, firms 
can receive a positive opinion from their auditor. 
 
 
“IFRS has benefits, but only if there are 
strong supporting institutions.” 
                                    Professor Holger Daske 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Transparency: financial disclosure is essential. 
 In a global world, common accounting standards are necessary. 
 Strong institutions are required to guarantee homogeneity in reporting. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ To what extent are accountability and efficiency complements or substitutes?  
2/ To what extent is the audit committee aligned with your organization’s strategy? 
3/ How much time is dedicated to compliance in your company and is there a formalized 
     compliance structure in place?  
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3. Private equity investments, value creation 
and social consequences 
 
Professor Jose-Miguel Gaspar, ESSEC Business School 
Mr. Vincent Gombault, Managing Director Funds of Funds 
 and Private Debt, Axa Private Equity 
            Mr. Jean-Louis Grevet, Founding and Managing Partner, 
                                                                           Perceva Capital 
 
s an asset class, private equity in Europe has performed well, creating value and 
delivering good returns. Why should that be? One notable reason is better governance 
characteristics due to the factor that private equity investors are highly engaged directors. 
And yet the private equity industry faces image problems, not least because its effects may 
produce extremes that opinion has difficulty in comprehending: at times buyouts result in lost 
jobs, while some deals produce massive rewards. 
A good track record 
Private equity has been an extremely successful asset class. Professor Gaspar defines private 
equity as an investment model that concentrates firm ownership in the hands of active, 
professional investors. As a result of the industry’s success, there are now about 30,000 funds 
around the world, managing $3 trillion. Research on private equity yields several important 
insights. 
 
 
 
 
 
Why is private equity so successful?  
 
 Superior performance 
 Highly pro-cyclical activity 
 Returns are counter-cyclical 
 Persistence in performance 
 Better governance characteristics 
 Growth strategies 
 
 
Superior performance: Private equity produces higher margins, higher productivity and higher 
capital efficiency than other investment classes.  
Highly pro-cyclical activity: The amount of private equity activity fluctuates with economic 
cycles. During boom times, cash is plentiful and there is more activity.  
Returns are counter-cyclical: While activity is high during boom times, the abundance of cash 
drives up prices and drives down returns. The best performing funds are those started in bad 
times.  
The industry exhibits persistence in performance: Unlike other asset classes like mutual funds 
which do not repeatedly do well over and over again, a good private equity fund will 
repeatedly perform well.  
Better governance characteristics: One of the reasons private equity performs better is its 
governance. Companies owned by private equity firms have smaller boards, with more 
outsiders, which meet more often.  
Growth strategies: In the 1980s, private equity investors bought underperforming companies, 
fired management and loaded companies with debt. But today in Europe, leveraged 
buyouts are a growth story.  
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Private equity has evolved from a niche asset class to a more mainstream, more stable 
investment 
According to Vincent Gombault, private equity was initially an “alternative” investment, 
which is no longer true. Even after the recent financial crises, most funds are able to raise 
capital, and the total amount raised is significant. Mr. Gombault’s observations on the 
industry include:  
Greater stability: Today there is less volatility. Funds are using less debt (about 50%), and few 
deals (< 1%) end up in bankruptcy. With low interest rates, investors shouldn’t expect 20 - 25% 
IRRs, but 10 - 15% is realistic.  
Longer horizons: Private equity investors are keeping their investments long term, such as five 
years. Because of this long-term focus, the 20% carry aligns interests.  
Private equity investments in France’s mid-market require focus, expertise and experience  
Because of France’s unique environment and laws, knowledge and expertise of the French 
market is essential. With this focus, Perceva views each investment as different, requiring 
different strategies and actions. This might include shoring up a balance sheet, reassuring 
creditors, working with local authorities or developing new products to drive growth. Each 
investment is handled differently based on the specific situation.  
The private equity industry struggles with image  
As an industry, private equity has a bad image. Mr.  Gombault suggested this is because 
successful deals can result in very large returns, which are reported by the press in a negative 
light. Professor Gaspar sees such returns are a natural result of taking risk. In looking at specific 
areas affecting the industry’s image, he concludes:  
 
 
Jobs 
 
 
Innovation 
 
Leverage 
 
 
Incentives 
 
 Net job creation is negative, as private equity investments 
often shed jobs. However, these investments also create 
jobs, and those jobs tend to be higher level and better 
paying.  
 Companies owned by private equity investors have no 
innovation advantage.  
 
 The use of leverage is only responsible for about one third 
of the industry’s returns; improving firm performance and 
selling assets at favorable times are also responsible for 
about one third.  
 
 The intent of the standard model of 2% fees and 20% carry 
is to aligned incentives. However, research shows that 60% 
of the present value of a general partner’s compensation 
comes in the 2% fees. 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
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INSIGHTS 
Behind the over-performance of private equity investments:  
 Concentrated ownership 
 In the hands of  professional active investors 
 With a long term view 
 Leverage 
 And controlled risk-taking. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
 
1/ How can you transfer the keys to the success of private equity to your company? 
2/ What would be the costs (job losses, etc.) for society?  
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4. Shareholder power and responsibilities and 
Engagement policies with active institutional 
investors  
 
Professor Patricia Charléty, ESSEC Business School 
Mr. Bernard Icard, Head of Equity Proprietary Investment, 
 Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations 
Mr. Hector Lehuedé, Senior Policy Analyst, OECD 
Professor B. Espen Eckbo, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Mr. Vegard Torsnes, Ownership Policy Group, Norges 
 Bank Investment Management (NBIM) 
Mr. John C. Wilcox, CEO, Sodali 
 
 
he power of shareholders varies by country based on a country’s laws and regulations. 
While the specifics vary by country, in general shareholders can exercise power by 
proposing resolutions and directors, engaging in proxy fights, and how they vote. Moreover, 
with short holding periods and high ownership rates of index funds and EFTs, many 
shareholders are not interested in governance. 
However, there are still engaged, responsible shareholders who behave as owners by holding 
stocks long term and by actively engaging with firm management. 
The power of shareholders varies by country, by company and by shareholder 
A common view is that shareholders are passive and have lost power, and that power has 
transferred to boards. While in certain cases this may be true, in some countries shareholders 
have greater legal protection and also more power. Ways that shareholders can exercise 
power include:  
 In private: Shareholders can meet with management, raise difficult questions and 
    express their views.  
 In public: Shareholders can use the media, engage in proxy fights and submit 
    resolutions on topics such as say-on-pay.  
 Voting: Shareholders can propose and vote for resolutions; it is easier to oppose 
    management by proposing resolutions than vote against management-sponsored 
    resolutions, as about 95% pass. They can also try to build alliances to vote 
    for/against a resolution.  
 Proposing directors: Depending on the country, shareholders may be able to 
    nominate directors.  
Changes in market conditions require rethinking the rights and obligations of shareholders  
The OECD has published a study on the election and remuneration of directors in various 
countries. This study shows that while shareholders can express dissatisfaction in several ways, 
it is rare for shareholders to exercise voting rights, and a proxy fight is difficult and expensive.  
As a result, what is left to shareholders is to approve or reject the board. However, rules vary 
from country to country: in some, shareholders can nominate directors, in others shareholders 
are not allowed to nominate directors and in others still, the ownership threshold to nominate 
may be up to 10%. In addition, contesting the election of directors is rare. Changes in the 
market require rethinking the rights and obligations of shareholders.  
Key shareholder areas include: 
 Board profiling: A trend among companies in selecting directors is to create a specific 
profile for the skills and experiences desired in a new director. 
T 
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 Lack of voting: Increasingly, asset owners are index funds, ETFs or foreign investors that 
have little interest in a company’s governance. In some countries asset owners are 
actually not allowed to vote. 
 
 
“Many asset owners are not worrying about 
voting.” 
                                    Hector Lehuedé 
 
 Shorter holding periods: Contributing to the lack of interest in voting and governance 
is shorter holding periods by investors, who aren’t behaving as interested long-term 
investors. Mr. Lehuedé said that the average holding period of a stock in 1991 was 2‒3 
years; today on average, an NYSE stock is held for just five days. 
Deeply engaged asset owners can have much power 
Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations invests $11 billion in European equities, which it holds long 
term, for an average of 5 - 7 years, with fund managers taking a bottom-up approach, 
conducting industry analysis and engaging in thorough due diligence. While the firm remains 
a minority owner, fund managers still meet once yearly with the top management of every 
company they own. These occasions are not always friendly, as fund managers, accredited 
with the right to vote and attend shareholder meetings, do ask hard questions.  
 
 
“We need access to top management. It is 
the only way to really address issues with 
companies” 
                                    Bernard Icard 
 
This “soft engagement” positions the firm as a responsible investor, pushes companies to 
incorporate corporate governance as a value and promotes the firm’s own values. 
And what about active institutional investors? 
 
Institutional investors, who care about good governance and are increasingly factoring 
governance into their investment decisions, engage with the companies they own through 
direct interactions and by voting. Moreover, it is in the best interests of companies to engage 
with their shareholders, actively getting to know who their shareholders are, building a 
relationship with them and explaining their governance practices and customizing 
communication. 
 
NBIM sees corporate governance as an important part of its investment decisions 
 
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM) is the asset manager of Norway’s sovereign 
wealth fund, with $650 billion in assets, 60% of which are invested in equities, 30% in fixed 
income and 5% in real estate. NBIM is a long-term investor with a goal of building and 
safeguarding value over the next 30 years. NBIM seeks moderate risk and high returns.  
 
As a long-term investor, NBIM buys companies that its fund managers believe in and strives to 
build trust-based relationships with its companies. Given that fund managers evaluate 
companies, they are expected to integrate corporate governance into their analysis.  
 
NBIM is a top 5 shareholder in 800 companies and a top 10 shareholder in 2,400 companies, 
and, overall, owns shares in 8,000 companies worldwide. Because of its size and prominence, 
NBIM sees its responsibility to be an engaged investor. 
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Key factors for NBIM are:   
 
 Transparency 
 Board accountability 
 
Transparency 
NBIM is a transparent investor and discloses in its own quarterly reports on how it voted. It 
demands transparency in the companies in which it invests. 
 
Board accountability 
NBIM expects to see high levels of accountability at board level in the companies in which it 
invests. 
 
Once NBIM owns shares in a company, it exercises its rights as a shareholder primarily through 
voting and all funds at NBIM that own shares in a company come together to decide how to 
vote. In deciding how to vote, NBIM makes its own decision and does not rely on checklists 
from an organization such as ISS. NBIM attends shareholder meetings and engages with 
companies directly where appropriate. Moreover, when interacting with a company, NBIM 
expects to hear from the company why they should vote a certain way. 
 
 
“Corporate governance is becoming a 
more important part of investment 
decisions” 
                                    Vegard Torsnes 
 
There are many steps that corporations can take to improve their corporate governance and 
how their governance is perceived by investors 
 
John C. Wilcox, CEO of Sodali, remarks that companies that do not engage with shareholders 
get the shareholders they deserve. For him, engagement is not rocket science and 
recommends several simple, though effective steps to take:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key steps for Sodali are:   
 
 Benchmarking corporate governance 
against peers 
 Explaining the business rationale for 
governance 
 Analyzing who the firm’s shareholders are. 
Know your audience and listen to them. 
 Developing a holistic investor relations 
program and viewing the shareholders 
meeting as a governance event. 
 
 
 
“Companies are under pressure to be more 
flexible and customized in how they 
communicate with shareholders.” 
                                    John C. Wilcox 
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_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 
 Good corporate governance and transparency are increasingly 
important criteria for long term investment choices in companies. 
 Profiling, selecting directors and board accountability are priorities for 
shareholders.  
 It is in the mutual interest of long term investors and companies alike to 
engage with each other. 
 Engaged investors do actually promote the firm’s own values. 
 Companies should analyze who their shareholders are and be 
customized in how they communicate with them. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT…  
1/ To what extent should regulations require shareholders to have more responsibilities 
     through mandatory voting? What would influence the effectiveness of this?        
2/ Historically, funds have separated the investment decisions from efforts related to 
     corporate governance. How would highly analytical analysts incorporate softer 
     governance issues into their decisions? 
3/ What is the sense (if any!) of a “one share, one vote” approach?  
4/ In your view, to what extent is the best protection from being subject to takeover keeping 
     shareholders informed?   
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 GOVERNANCE AND THE BOARD 
 
“Corporate governance is different from management. Management runs the enterprise. The board or governing 
body ensures that it is being run well and in the right direction.” 
 
Bob Tricker* 
 
*Tricker, R. I., Corporate Governance - practices, procedures and powers in British companies and their boards of directors, Gower, Aldershot UK, 1984 
 
 
he health of businesses may have a huge positive impact on society, the environment and 
the economy, and purposeful governance can make all the difference. This commitment 
towards the wider perspective is discussed in the following texts which together forward 
proposals on how to improve the professionalism of boards, learn from cultural approaches to 
board management, align shareholder and company interests, seek models of excellence in 
family-run businesses and add increased value to boards via the presence of women and 
employee representation.  
 
Five scenarios:    
 
 Trends in board leadership and shareholder engagement policies 
 Leadership of family and state firm boards 
 Women on boards: director gender quotas 
 Employee participation 
 Board crisis management: China v. the US. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T 
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1. Trends in board leadership and shareholder 
engagement policies 
 
 
Professor B. Espen Eckbo, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Professor Paul Danos, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Professor Pei Sun, School of Management, Fudan University 
Professor Karin Thorburn, Norwegian School of Economics 
 and Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance at Tuck 
Mr. Vegard Torsnes, Ownership Policy Group, Norges Bank 
Investment Management (NBIM) 
Mr. John C. Wilcox, CEO, Sodali 
 
 
t the core of corporate governance is the role of the board in overseeing how 
management serves the long-term interests of shareholders and other stakeholders. 
International perspectives diverge on the primary responsibilities of board directors, with an 
Anglo-Saxon model that emphasizes the protection of shareholders’ assets and return on 
investment, while in continental Europe many feel that the board’s responsibility is to protect 
the employees first, and shareholders second. 
 
 
“Management boards are responsible for 
managing the enterprise in the interests of 
stakeholders; they have an obligation not 
just to shareholders but to society.”” 
                             Professor Klaus-Peter Müller 
 
Klaus-Peter Müller argues that Germany’s voluntary code on corporate governance helps 
strengthen the business community, and increases the attractiveness of the country’s 
companies and capital markets to international investors. “Companies don’t have to 
obey, but they do have to explain. Comply or explain.” For Müller, the flexibility of the 
German Corporate Governance Code is not an expression of bad governance, but the key 
is to explain when there are deviations. This provides transparency to the capital markets so 
that they can draw their own conclusions. 
For John Wilcox, CEO of Sodali, it is important for shareholders and companies to align their 
interests. He prefers a slightly different version to the German model. “Boards should have to 
comply AND explain. Boards need to give sufficient information to shareholders so they can 
make informed votes about the quality of directors.” Wilcox believes boards should have a 
legal duty to explain to shareholders how they are doing their job with an obligation to write 
a memorandum about how the company is run, how decisions are made and what the 
company’s values and culture are. This, he believes, will drive directors to think more about 
how they do their job.  
With a fiduciary responsibility to protect the interests of the firm and its owners, Professor B. 
Espen Eckbo identifies some of the key challenges to board effectiveness. He questions 
whether a board that meets 8 times a year is sufficient to be effective, and highlights the 
difficulty for minority shareholders to have their voices heard.  
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Professor B. Espen Eckbo identifies 6 
areas of focus to ensure improved 
professionalism of the board of 
directors:   
 
 
 Election reform 
 Remuneration 
 Education 
 Director independence 
 Activism 
 Talent search 
Election reform 
Efforts aim to make it easier and less expensive for shareholders to vote on directors. 
 
Remuneration 
 Say-on-pay is a trend that is pushing boards to be more sensitive to executive compensation. 
 
Education 
Directors must be more informed about many topics, especially risk management. 
 
Director independence 
The trend toward having greater board independence is increasing. 
 
Activism 
Many stakeholders are increasingly active in trying to bring about changes in the board. 
 
Talent search 
Boards are broadening what they are look for in terms of criteria, such as more women and a 
diversity of experiences. 
 
There is much at stake. When companies take the initiative on corporate governance, they 
can preempt activism among shareholders and avoid onerous legislation and rules. Yet all 
too often, companies and their shareholders have adversarial relationships and fail to 
achieve diversity without the threat of legal action. 
Surprisingly, minority investors can play a key role in China, even with state-owned enterprises 
 
In China, ownership is often concentrated with a controlling shareholder, particularly the 
state. Institutional investors can, however, still play an important role though it is important to 
note that while pension funds are prohibited from investing in the stock market, mutual funds 
can.  
 
The key roles of institutional investors in 
China are: 
 
 
 Passing resolutions: The votes of controlling 
shareholders don’t count when passing 
resolutions, so they must rely on others, 
including institutional investors. 
 Nominating directors: To nominate directors, 
such as former party officials, mutual fund 
support may be required.  
 
What can be done to improve how companies are governed? 
 
John Wilcox states that the relationship between companies and shareholders is often 
described as being adversarial and a power struggle. This need not be the case as 
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shareholders and companies want the same things. It is because of this, that it is important for 
shareholders and companies to align their interests.  
 
 
Shareholders and companies can align 
interests by:  
 
 
 Adopting the ‘comply or explain model’  
 
 Private sector initiative 
 Frequent communication 
 Good governance among shareholders 
 Elimination of short-termism 
 Business statesmanship 
 
 
Adopt the “comply or explain” model: In Europe, some guidelines are voluntary, granting 
companies flexibility to comply or explain why they have not complied. Mr. Wilcox prefers a 
slightly different version: ‘comply and explain’, which would drive directors to think more 
about how they do their job. 
 
 
“Boards should have to comply AND 
explain. Boards need to give sufficient 
information to shareholders so they can 
make informed votes about the quality of 
directors.” 
                                    John C. Wilcox 
 
Private sector initiative: Often shareholders seek rights and often companies dig in their heels 
and refuse, as a result producing legislation and firm rules that no one likes. In this light, 
corporations need to take the initiative to come up with solutions that improve governance. 
Moreover, companies that proactively engage with their shareholders can control 
shareholder activism. When a company accepts capital and becomes a public company, 
part of the deal is that the company should be willing to engage with shareholders - the 
annual shareholders meeting being regarded as a governance event. 
 
 
“Activism occurs when companies have not 
done a good job of engaging with their 
shareholders.” 
                                    John C. Wilcox 
 
Frequent communication: Companies must decide who their spokesperson is and what 
topics to speak with investors about, including performance and risk management, 
remuneration, succession planning, director recruitment and evaluation, ethics, culture, 
reputation and more. While lawyers often say that boards can’t communicate such 
information to shareholders, none of this constitutes material, non-public information. 
 
Good governance among shareholders: Often institutional investors themselves are not well 
governed. They demonstrate a lack of fiduciary duties. A new code is therefore required to 
guide the conduct of institutional investors. 
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Elimination of short-termism: Many of the problems that exist can be traced to investors and 
companies that are focused on the short term. Everyone needs to take a look in the mirror 
and work to rectify this.  
 
Business statesmanship: Former GE CEO Reginald Jones was a statesman who understood the 
responsibility of serving all stakeholders. In contrast, Jack Welch personified the celebrity CEO 
who was focused on his position, pay and perks. We need business leaders – much in the vein 
of Reginald Jones - who are statesmen. 
 
Long-term investors can use governance as a lever to improve long-term company 
performance 
 
Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), the world’s largest sovereign wealth fund, 
believes its competitive advantage is to use its long-term perspective to work with companies 
to improve their governance and performance, providing NBIM with superior returns. NBIM is 
an active investor that votes its shares and engages with the companies it owns. 
 
Diversity in the boardroom has value. Even though the value of gender quotas is inconclusive, 
such quotas can have important social benefits 
 
Today, about one in seven directors in Europe is a woman and most of these female directors 
are from countries that have adopted quotas such as Norway, where woman account for 
42% of directors. Data shows that female directors are more likely to be independent 
outsiders and in general, outsiders are often better able to perform the monitoring function 
on boards while insiders are stronger in the advisory function. 
 
Overall, it is inconclusive whether having more women on boards creates value for 
companies or investors. Whereas there is some evidence showing some positive results, it is 
hard to conclude that there is a causal relationship. However, when boards do have more 
women the educational level on the board rises, attendance at board meetings increases 
and boards may have a greater stakeholder orientation. In Norway, after voluntary targets 
for female board representation were not achieved, the government specified quotas for the 
largest companies and were told that if they were not compliant by April 2008, they would be 
dissolved. This hard line resulted in full compliance, but while these quotas have increased 
female representation on boards, the impact on company/shareholder value is unclear. 
Mandatory quotas are fundamentally a political issue, but history shows that often this is the 
only way to change society. Quotas force change and it is for these reasons why they may 
be beneficial. Moreover, quotas for women on boards have been enacted or are being 
considered in Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. 
 
 
“We have seen little change without legal 
action.” 
                                    Professor Karin Thorburn 
 
 
 
 
 
Student Survey findings 
Who should have most influence on the selection of 
corporate board members? Number of responses:  
Shareholders                                (Most) 173    (Some) 99 
Company management           (Most) 122    (Some) 121 
Current board members            (Most) 69      (Some) 146 
 Employees                                   (Most) 46      (Some) 148   
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_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 The relationship between companies and their shareholders need not 
be adversarial: companies and shareholders often want the same 
things. 
 Boards should broaden in terms of criteria and represent more diversity 
in terms of experience. 
 The trend is toward having greater board independence. 
 Boards have an obligation not to just shareholders but to society. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ Should boards comply OR explain (“European view”) or comply AND explain (J Wilcox)?    
2/ How can shareholders (stakeholders) and board interests be aligned? 
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2.  Leadership of family and state firm boards 
 
Professor Pei Sun, School of Management, Fudan University 
Mr. André Chieng, Chairman, AEC, China 
Mr. Bernhard Simon, Managing Director and Family Spokesman, 
 Executive Management Board, Dachser GmbH 
 
 
overnance is extremely important for family-owned firms. Thinking hard about good 
governance allows family firms to build trust, succeed across generations and attract 
talented managers and directors. In China, the environment and philosophy has been 
conducive to creating family-owned companies, but has not been favorable to transmitting 
companies from one generation to the next. State enterprises in China, which have been 
supported by the population, have been numerous and largely successful. But as China’s 
economy and middle class grow, the future path for these firms is not clear. 
 
Bernhard Simon explains here why governance is so important in a family-owned company 
and describes how governance works at his family-owned firm. In parallel, André Chieng 
discusses both state and family-owned firms in China, with particular focus on the challenges 
these organizations face. 
 
Even in family firms, corporate governance is extremely important 
 
Operating in the transportation and logistics sector, Bernhard Simon’s firm fundamentally sells 
trust built on good governance. The family and the company’s management think about 
and talk about governance frequently. The family has a family constitution, and the 
governance structure the family has decided upon is that the family is a shareholder, has a 
family office with a spokesman and the family focuses on the company’s direction, values, 
M&A, financing and whether management is fulfilling the company’s mission. Practically, the 
family has delegated power to the supervisory board (with two family representatives) and a 
management board. These boards decide on the company’s strategy, investments, 
succession plans, compensation and dividends, risk management and other financial and 
operational issues, with a clear rule that the family cannot override them.  
 
 
“We make clear that the responsibility of 
family members is to be shareholders.” 
                                    Bernhard Simon 
 
This governance structure has proven successful. The company has grown and performed 
well and has been able to attract and retain talented executives and outside directors, and 
the family is now in its third generation of ownership. Even though executives and directors do 
not receive equity in the company, they are attracted by competitive compensation and a 
stable yet entrepreneurial environment. 
 
China’s environment has been conducive to the creation of new family-owned firms, but has 
not been favorable to the transmission of firms 
 
In the West, there are many companies that have existed for hundreds of years, but in China, 
the concept of companies is more recent. However, companies were often created for 
different purposes than in the West: while a business offers less prestige than being a 
government official, it might serve the purpose of providing for a family. Despite different 
types of governments in China, the general philosophy of Confucianism, which has always 
G 
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been important in China, has been favorable regarding the creation of new companies by 
families. However, China has faced challenges in transmitting companies from one 
generation to the next, the problem being that preference was given to kinship, not expertise 
or capability, with the result that companies passed on to the next generation often fail. 
 
 
“Thinking hard about good governance 
allows family firms to build trust, succeed 
across generations and attract talented 
managers and directors.” 
                                     Professor Pei Sun 
 
André Chieng believes Chinese families can learn from the success of Jewish families, where 
children initially work outside of the family company to gain experience and prove their 
success, and then compete in order for the most capable family member to be chosen to 
lead the company. In comparison, it must be emphasized that China’s one-child policy 
would make this more challenging. 
 
The attitude toward state firms in China is very different than in the West; the future of China’s 
state-owned enterprises is unclear 
 
State firms are rare in the West and those in the West have negative opinions of China’s state 
firms. However, the attitude in China is different because these firms are seen as belonging to 
the public with many typically seen as elite. In general, these firms have performed relatively 
well and had fewer problems than U.S. firms during the recent financial crisis. 
 
While referred to as “firms” or “companies”, the government-appointed managers of these 
entities have taken orders about what to produce, who to employ and what to invest in. The 
state and the managers leading these firms often have had contradictory objectives, such as 
increasing employment while not losing money, that differ from those of typical enterprises. 
The government now says that it will be less involved in overseeing state enterprises, stating 
that it is focused on a market economy and will return state-owned firms to the private sector 
in order to compete in the global marketplace. But the jury is still out. The state still interferes in 
the management of firms and still has the power to appoint the CEO, which is typically an 
opaque process. As China’s economy and middle class grow, the future path for these firms 
remains unclear. 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Good Corporate Governance is naturally associated with long run 
performance for family owned firms. 
 Responses to guarantee that the firm is run in the family’s interest vary 
across companies/cultures: delegation to a management board under 
the supervision of the family, delegating management to a selected 
member of the family. 
_____________________________________________________ 
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FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ Transmission is often critical in family owned companies and the specific problem should 
     be addressed (competition between possible candidates in the family members, etc.). 
     How?       
2/ Is a “family constitution” at Dachser a generic solution to potential specific issues in family 
     owned companies? 
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3.  Women on boards: of gender and power 
 
Professor Karin Thorburn, Norwegian School of Economics 
 and Lindenauer Center for Corporate Governance at Tuck 
Professor Viviane de Beaufort, ESSEC Business School 
Ms. Noreen Doyle, Director, Credit Suisse 
Ms. Susan Lindenauer, Director, Women's Legal Defense Funds 
 
n 1911, the French Academy of Sciences failed to elect Marie Curie to be a member by a 
margin of one vote, electing instead a little remembered man who was involved in wireless 
telegraphy. No wonder the first woman to win a Nobel Prize, and the only person to win 
Nobels in multiple sciences, observed that “the way of progress was neither swift nor easy.” 
Gender diversity in the boardroom is a case in point. A century after Curie was overlooked by 
the French Academy of Sciences, the statistics on the number of women who have reached 
an executive board position make disappointing reading. Yet with so much research showing 
that organizational performance is improved when there is a more gender balance, it is 
difficult to understand why businesses haven’t been quicker to put this right. 
Professor Karin Thorburn’s review of academic evidence on the voluntary appointments of 
female directors to European boards shows the progress made in Norway over the last 
decade - now boasting a 42% female board representation. While other European countries 
have set similar goals for the years ahead, progress remains slow. The absence of sanctions 
may explain the fact that Spain has only 11% female board directors, though it is Italy that will 
have to change gears if the country is to meet its quota by 2015 from the current level of only 
6%. 
More women are serving on more boards because of quotas and a greater focus on diversity 
 
When Norway’s voluntary targets for female board representation were not met, the 
government specified quotas, informing the largest companies that if compliance was not 
reached by April 2008, the company would be dissolved. The result was full compliance. “We 
have seen little change without legal action”, Thornburn observes. 
I 
Country Year passed Quota 
size 
Year of 
compliance 
Sanctions % female 
directors 
Norway 2003 40% 2008 yes 42% 
Spain 2007 40% 2015 no 11% 
Iceland 2010 40% 2013 yes 25% 
Finland 2010 one 2010 yes 27% 
France 2011 40% 2017 yes 22% 
Belgium 2011 33% 2019 yes 11% 
Netherlands 2011 30% 2016 no 19% 
Italy 2011 33% 2015 yes 6% 
European Union Women on the Board Pledge for Europe 14% 
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But does greater gender diversity on the board create value for companies or investors? 
Though Professor Thorburn identifies a number of studies that find a positive relationship 
between the percentage of female directors and firm performance, based on stock 
performance, ROE, sales growth and other indicators, she points out that it is impossible to 
make any inferences about causality. “Are profitable firms more likely to hire woman? Or do 
women prefer directorships in profitable firms? We face similar issues with studies that find a 
correlation between gender diversity and CSR or better management practices, and it is 
difficult to claim that adding women to the board will improve company performance.” 
However, shareholders seem to value voluntary appointments of female directors more than 
appointments of male directors. A study of new outside director appointments in Australia 
from 2004 to 2006 showed that stock price reaction was significantly higher (approx. 2%) on 
the announcement of female directors, and similar results have been noted in Spain and 
Singapore. 
Data also shows that greater gender diversity on US boards positively affects the monitoring 
function of the board, with better attendance records, and a higher likelihood of equity-
based board compensation. Greater monitoring increases the value of firms with weak 
shareholder rights, though it reduces the value of firms with strong shareholder rights. 
The example set at the top then spills over from the board to top management. Firms with 
more women on the board have more female top executives, though the existing corporate 
culture may also serve to attract more women. 
The composition of non-profit boards is very different from boards of for-profit companies 
In the United States, non-profit boards tend to be much larger (often having 30 or so board 
members, to assist with the goal of fundraising), and women represent 43% of the directors on 
these boards. However, the representation of women is highest among non-profits with 
smaller budgets, but is much lower at non-profits that have budgets of more than $100 million. 
 
So how does greater gender balance effect the decisions made by the board? When 
Norwegian quota firms were compared to similar non-quota firms elsewhere in Scandinavia, 
they were found to undertake fewer workforce reductions, and saw a relative increase in 
employment levels and labor costs that coincided with a relative decline in operating 
profitability. Critics would argue that adding more women on the board had damaged the 
bottom line, favoring altruism over profitability.  
In the wake of the quota, many non-listed Norwegian firms - often small, profitable firms with 
concentrated ownership and few if any women on the board - changed their legal structure 
to avoid compliance. Did they feel that the quota destroyed value, or was it done to protect 
the male incumbents? It is hard to say, but overall it is difficult to conclude that the reform 
had any long-term valuation effects. 
 
“Women have tremendous capabilities and 
fit well on boards.” 
                         Professor Viviane de Beaufort 
 
So should corporate board gender quotas be imposed? Because the evidence about the 
impact on a firm’s value is inconclusive, the board gender quota is a purely political and 
gender equality issue. In Norway for example, the quota was proposed by the Ministry for 
Children, Family and Equality. But without legal action, little will change. After all, in the UK a 
golf club membership is a four times better predictor of receiving a corporate board position 
than a top university education. Perhaps the question therefore is whether we want a society 
where men and women have equal influence and economic power? And for Professor 
Thorburn, there is only one answer to that question.  
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Women and their relationship to Power: Taboo or new Corporate Governance Model? 
While women still represent fewer than one in five corporate board members of Fortuna 500 
companies in the US, with similarly dismal percentages elsewhere in the world, the dial is 
slowly shifting towards higher levels of gender diversity. Given the skills, experience and insight 
that women bring to the position, boards that fail to include more women, irrespective of 
legislation or quotas, are missing out on an important voice when making critical decisions 
that affect corporate performance. 
But as the percentage of women on boards increases, is there an opportunity for companies 
to embrace a new mixed power model that blends the best of leadership, decision-making 
and capability on the one hand, and rationality, empathy and organization on the other? 
Research by Professor Viviane de Beaufort of the ESSEC Business School suggests that greater 
gender balance can positively impact the governance model. 
Based on a qualitative study that included interviews with Board Members, Company 
Directors, politicians and civil servants from France and abroad, Professor de Beaufort looks at 
the different relationship women have with power, whether a female style of leadership exists, 
and how women have the opportunity to position themselves differently to then promote 
different governance values and managerial practices. 
If women can shift from being a minority on the male dominated board, they may no longer 
face pressure to become more masculine in the way they exert power - and in doing so lose 
the feminine qualities that contribute to the ‘wealth’ of the Board - and produce a 
juxtaposition of opinions and personalities that make ‘good advice’. This viewpoint was 
expressed by 69% of the French and 78% of the international interviewees involved in the 
research, who felt that women have specific qualities or attributes for board membership 
(see boxes for examples). 
 
 
“Women do things for the good of the 
company and not for appearances. They 
have a real concern about making things 
move forward; they are less into politics and 
their personal positioning. They bring more 
objectivity and sense of the practical. 
Women are idealists and impassioned.” 
 
                                                         S. Ouziel 
 
  
“More collective, using less unverifiable 
assertions, more courageous, more able to 
think freely.”  
                                   D. Ernotte-Cunci 
 
 
“Capable of cooperation and compromise, 
better ability to anticipate through listening 
and intuition, better sense of the concrete.” 
 
                                                          A. Arcier 
 
Source: Replies to a study by Prof. Viviane de Beaufort 
 
The results also suggest that women who seek positions of power and mandates on boards 
are more interested in a power to ‘act’ rather than power for power’s sake. Motivated by a 
strong desire for good governance, to have an impact, and serve the general interest, many 
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respondents spoke of the collective exercise of power, advocating a non-executive Board 
set-up and run as a team.  
All the women interviewed shared an 
acute sense of responsibility when it 
come to power, notably regarding four 
aspects:  
 
 
 The duty to participate in the change of a 
system of Governance  
 The absolute respect of the rules and 
ethical principles 
 A responsibility towards other women, 
namely those of the younger generation 
 The belief that exerting power requires 
courage 
 
One of the most striking findings, in an age of gender quotas and compliance, is the 
importance of having the right skills in order to justify their position on the Board. Women are 
often judged on their experience and accomplishments, whereas men sometimes have the 
privilege of being judged on their potential.  
De Beaufort’s research also identifies areas in which the governance model should change, 
with the implication that stronger female representation would help achieve these goals. 
Many women consider that the current model is too financial, and not sufficiently 
operational, with HR policies and aspects including succession planning and technical and 
technological skills systematically lacking on the Board agenda. 
They also state that while the issue of compensation is important, and should be linked to 
more demanding and specific performance criteria, the role of the board is to ensure the 
sustainability of the company and not just the income of Board members. 
Gender diversity in the boardroom may be slow, but the benefits to the business are 
compelling. With a more consumer-oriented outlook, a focus on sustainable development, 
and both analytical and people skills, women bring vision, respect ethics, and are willing to 
change the status quo – all valuable contributions that would help overturn current public 
attitudes to corporations.  
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Gender quotas are mainly a political and gender equality issue: 
nothing would change without a law. 
 No clear conclusion can be drawn regarding the presence of women 
on boards and firm value. 
 Greater gender diversity enhances the monitoring (versus advisory) role 
of boards. 
 Greater gender diversity is correlated with higher attendance (for both 
men and women). 
 Women seem more attached to “social values” (jobs, etc.), than men.  
_____________________________________________________ 
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FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ Compared with a man, how does the judgment differ when deciding on whether a 
      woman qualifies for a board position?     
2/ Is increasing representation of women on boards a solution for a more society-oriented 
     Corporate Governance?  
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4.  Employee participation on the board 
 
 Dr. Christoph Schneider, University of Mannheim, Business School 
Mr. Alain Champigneux, Employee Elected Board Member, Renault 
Dr. Werner Brandt, CFO, SAP AG 
Professor Katsunori Mikuniya, University of Tokyo; 
former Commissioner, Financial Services Agency of Japan 
Mr. Thierry Peugeot, Chairman, Supervisory Board, Peugeot SA 
 
hile few would challenge the importance of employees as stakeholders whose 
perspective can help companies to make sound long-term decisions, there are two 
differing views about their representation on a corporate board. Dr. Christoph Schneider of 
the University of Mannheim Business School summarizes them as Voluntary Representation, in 
which a board’s representation is not mandated but should be determined by the owners of 
the firm’s assets, and Mandatory Representation, involving laws that require employee 
representation on the board.  
Countries have adopted different models and laws regarding employee representation and 
laws in Germany do not require representation if a firm has fewer than 500 employees, but 
require that large companies such as SAP provide 50% of their board seats to employee 
representatives. In contrast, in France, representation is required if employees own more than 
3% of the stock, and in the case of Peugeot, two employees participate in board meetings, 
but they do not have voting rights. Lastly, in Japan, it is rare that employees are represented 
at board level, but employees have a high degree of protection under the law. 
So what are the ingredients for successful employee representation? Starting with the 
individual, Alain Champigneux underlines the importance of the representative’s 
background, position, and independence of mind to be credible and taken seriously by 
other directors and the management.  
 
“Employee representation provides a valuable 
perspective, creates peace between a 
company and trade unions and helps explain 
decisions externally along with mitigating risks.” 
                                        Alain Champigneux 
 
He argues that the individual should be representative of a large part of employees and be 
connected to them to ensure a good “bottom-up” as well as “top-down” circulation of 
information and relay between employees and directors, the best way of ensuring this being 
to have employee-elected directors stemming from the different trade unions. 
 
“Boards benefit from having a diversity of 
perspectives. Participants on the PSA 
supervisory board come from multiple 
geographies and have diverse experiences.” 
                                              Thierry Peugeot 
 
Among other benefits of employee representation is their deep attachment to a firm’s 
stability and success, as firm health ensures future employment. And as members of society, 
employees tend to care how a firm impacts society. Alain Champigneux sees no risk to 
having employee representation, though he recommends that employee representatives 
W 
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should be irreverent and not simply agree to everything, as employees often have important 
information about a firm and their voice offers an important perspective. He also believes 
that, unless removed for other reasons, 10 years is long enough for an employee 
representative to stay on a board before losing contact with employees and needing to pass 
the torch. 
 
“Boards should be ‘dream teams’ that 
include different points of view. A diversity of 
perspectives helps a board to make the best 
possible decisions.” 
                                  Alain Champigneux 
 
The possible down sides can include cultural conflicts on boards caused by employee 
representatives, leading to a contentious boardroom. Alain Champigneux also 
acknowledges that employees may focus on their own self-interest, as opposed to the 
interests of the firm, and may collude with management to make decisions that are not in the 
interests of other stakeholders, such as avoiding a takeover. 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Employees being long run stakeholders through their representation on 
boards favors consideration of long term objectives. 
 Employees have a unique knowledge of the company; their presence 
on boards favors “bottom-up” as well as “top-down” circulation of 
information for better informed decision making by the board and 
improved implementation of decisions.  
 The selection process of employees and organization of the Board 
should favor competence as well as a constructive dialogue within the 
Board.   
 Companies in different cultures/countries respond in different ways to 
the need to take the employees’ perspective into account. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ What are the benefits of mandatory employee representation on boards compared to 
      voluntary representation by companies?    
2/ Alain Champigneux stressed the possible drawbacks of employee influence on Corporate 
     Governance (self-interested focus, collusion with management). How to benefit from the 
     unique position of employees while limiting the downside consequences? 
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5.  Board crisis management: China v. the US 
Professor Paul Danos, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Mr. Stuart Cable, Goodwin Procter LLP 
Professor Xiaozu Wang, School of Management, Fudan University 
 
 
n the United States, laws and norms have been developed for how to handle a wide range 
of crises. In China, while the written laws are often quite similar to those in the U.S., the norms 
for board behavior and action are new and still evolving. 
Professor Paul Danos of the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth, Stuart Cable, a partner at 
law firm Goodwin Procter LLP and Professor Xiaozu Wang of Fudan University look at the 
differences between the world’s biggest economic powers. 
In the U.S., boards respond to crises based on law and lore 
A number of laws passed in 1933 guide the responsibilities of directors, and understanding 
these laws is critical, as “the buck stops in the boardroom.” For a corporation, any crisis is the 
responsibility of the board. A few rules are critical as boards make decisions during a crisis. 
These are:  
 Fiduciary duty: This concept has two key principles:  
       - duty of care: this means that in exercising judgment, the board of directors must 
                be careful and deliberate 
             -  duty of loyalty: this means that board members must be loyal to the company, 
                with no self-dealing. 
 Business judgment: this rule says that directors are free and flexible to make 
decisions in the best interests of the company as long as a director makes a 
decision with due care. If due care is used, a director will not be held personally 
responsible. 
 
In China, laws about board behavior are relatively new, and behaviors are still evolving 
China has adopted many of the corporate laws from the U.S. regarding board governance, 
as well as rules from Europe - particularly Germany - about having a separate supervisory 
board. However, even though the written laws are similar, they are recent and norms are still 
being developed. As Professor Xiaozu Wang explains, “We are still learning how to behave in 
a boardroom - it takes time.”  
To best illustrate the different responses of U.S. and Chinese boards, we can cite three 
examples of board crises:   
Example 1: A director receives an unsolicited letter from a party to acquire 100% of the firm. 
In China, a board would never receive such a letter because Chinese firms have one 
controlling stockholder. In the U.S., such a letter would be shared with the rest of the board, 
and it would cause the board to establish a process for deciding how to respond. This 
process would usually involve lawyers and investment bankers. If the board decided not to 
sell the company at this time, this decision would be protected by the business judgment rule. 
If the board decided to sell, it has the fiduciary duty to get the best price for shareholders. 
I 
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Example 2: A CEO is accused of sexual misconduct. 
In China, the board would convene and decide how to respond to minimize damage and 
protect the company’s reputation. The most likely action would be an investigation and the 
board chairman, who usually represents the largest shareholder and is more powerful than 
the other directors, would likely make the final decision. In the U.S., the response of the board 
would be very similar to that in China, though norms would require an independent 
investigation. Ultimately, the investigation would yield a report and the board would have to 
exercise judgment in making a decision. 
Example 3: A board receives notice from the SEC about a potential for a material 
misstatement. 
In China, the board may not react with urgency, as they may not see this as a crisis. However, 
because penalties for fraud are severe, any perceived hint of fraud would prompt an 
immediate board reaction. In the U.S., a board will quickly disclose that the company has 
been contacted by the SEC and will authorize an independent committee to investigate. 
Based on the investigation’s results, the board will decide how to proceed. The challenge is 
one of uncertainty, as investigations and actions by the SEC can take time. 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Despite similar rules, the practice of Corporate Governance differs.  
 History and ownership differences explain partly the differences 
observed. 
 Due to the presence of controlling shareholders in most Chinese firms: 
- some CG events do not occur (e.g. unsolicited takeover) 
- some CG problems essentially addressed by the Chairman of the Board 
usually represent the controlling shareholder rather than collectively by 
directors representing all shareholders (as in the U.S.)   
____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ The presence of a controlling shareholder as in China has benefits (involvement) but also 
    drawbacks: how can the organization of the Board protect the firm and minority 
    shareholders from conflicts of interest? 
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GOVERNANCE, THE CEO AND LEADERSHIP 
 
 
“Nearly all men can stand adversity, but if you want to test a man's character, give him power”.  
 
Abraham Lincoln 
 
hallenging times present opportunities for leadership to shine. In this last chapter, we 
focus on leadership qualities within the context of governance and the vital role of the 
CEO, from setting a firm framework of values based on integrity, accountability and 
transparency, to ensuring that business ventures gain good governance early. However, CEO 
image can run into rough waters when media scrutiny picks up fast on the apparent paradox 
of increased compensation in difficult times or mishandled crisis management that affects 
society and the planet at large. Via telling case studies, we cover CEO effectiveness, the 
pitfalls of media scrutiny and how crisis may give rise to true leadership moments.   
 
Six keys:  
 
 Entrepreneurial leadership vis-à-vis stakeholders 
 Compensation & CEO effectiveness 
 How integrity enables sustainable long-term performance 
 CEO: power, accountability and transparency 
 Media scrutiny and CEO effectiveness (BP case study) 
 Accountability and its limits - The Siemens case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C 
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1. Entrepreneurial leadership vis-à-vis stakeholders  
 
Mr. Geoffroy Roux de Bezieux, CEO, OMEA Telecom/Virgin Mobile 
 
 
egardless of company size or stage, corporate governance matters. Small companies 
should build in good governance early, as doing so readies the company for growth and 
prepares the company to raise capital.  
 
In addition to adopting basic governance principles, it is important for entrepreneurs to 
consider the perspectives of all stakeholders in order to change the common perception that 
business leaders are self-interested, to one where entrepreneurs and business leaders are 
seen as caring for all stakeholders. 
 
Even small, entrepreneurial companies need to think about corporate governance 
 
Geoffroy Roux de Bezieux advises entrepreneurs to think of their business as a small solo 
business, which means looking at the cash flow every day. On the other hand and in parallel, 
in terms of corporate governance, entrepreneurs need to treat their company as if it is a 
large multinational. 
 
When entrepreneurs start a company, their funds often come from friends and family, and 
little thought is given to corporate governance, with a tendency for a ‘deal with that later’ 
approach. It is right for an entrepreneur to focus primarily on growing the business and 
entrepreneurs typically have big dreams: they want to grow fast, raise capital and become a 
big company. Therefore, to ready the company for subsequent growth, to raise equity from 
external shareholders and to be transparent to investors, CEOs need to put basic principles of 
governance in place early on. Entrepreneurs are also often stubborn, have big egos, are 
fiercely independent and are not over-keen on setting up processes (such as financial 
controls) or involving others in important decisions (such as their own compensation). 
However, it must be repeated that the reason for entrepreneurs to care about good 
corporate governance is that it readies their company for the next steps of growth, including 
raising capital. 
 
 
“By improving governance from the 
beginning, it makes the company ready for its 
next steps.” 
                               Geoffroy Roux de Bezieux 
 
Bad corporate governance and corporate behavior have negative consequences for all 
businesses 
 
The recent economic crisis has widened the gap between the public and business leaders 
and since 2008, criticism of business has been sharp. The public believes that business leaders 
are self-interested with a tendency not act in the interests of all stakeholders or of the public. 
While these opinions are based primarily on the perception of big corporations, companies of 
all sizes are tarnished. This makes the job of an entrepreneur even more difficult.  
 
A result is that the public has called for more regulation and politicians are accommodating 
this demand. However, alternatives to prevent and avoid regulation are proactive self-
regulation and good corporate governance: if more companies behave properly, public 
attitudes will eventually change. Yet there are two major challenges to overcome in 
R 
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reaching this: firstly, that even one incident of misconduct reported by the sensationalist 
media will hurt any progress that is made and secondly, it is difficult to obtain alignment 
within the business community, which is not so much a fellowship as an “assembly of different 
interests.” 
 
 
“Corporate governance by big corporations 
will help corporations of all sizes. This will help 
show the general public that business is here 
to serve the common good” 
                         Geoffroy Roux de Bezieux 
 
 
Student Survey findings 
Who should have most influence on the decisions made 
by CEOs? No. of replies: 
Board of directors                  (Most) 173        (Some) 127 
Company management      (Most) 128        (Some) 176 
Customers                               (Most) 127        (Some) 126 
Employees                              (Most) 51           (Some) 197 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Corporate Governance is also an important issue for small, newly family 
financed businesses as it conditions the future growth of the company 
seeking external capital. 
 Misconduct from some companies, together with cases of business 
leaders’ calling for more (over?) regulation out of self-interest, creates 
top-heavy regulation. Good corporate governance and auto-
regulation are good responses to prevent (over) regulation.   
____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ Could Governance of the media and the political sphere be an issue to approach? 
2/ To what extent could/should sound governance (dealing with conflicts of interest, etc.) 
     principles be adapted to other (political, etc.) spheres?  
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2. Compensation and CEO Effectiveness  
 
Professor Ernst Maug, University of Mannheim, Business School 
Mr. Michel de Fabiani, Board Member and Chairman, 
 Appointments, Remuneration and Governance Committee, Vallourec 
Professor Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi, University of Mannheim, Business School 
 
 
t the same time as governments in Europe and around the world are imposing austerity 
measures and reducing social benefits, CEO compensation has risen dramatically. And 
the golden parachutes awarded to CEOs who left under a cloud of poor performance or 
scandals, are unfathomable to many. Often, media backlash and public anger trigger 
legislation.  
Why has CEO pay increased and what should boards do to better manage the issue? 
According to Professor Niessen-Ruenzi of the University of Mannheim Business School, CEO 
pay has increased in the absolute and has increased far more than the S&P index. The 
spread between what CEOs are paid and what other workers earn has also increased 
dramatically.  
 
Two theories to explain the gap 
between CEO and other employee 
remuneration: 
 
 
 
 
“Firms do react to public appearances 
about compensation. They change the 
composition of the pay, not the level.” 
       Professor Alexandra Niessen-Ruenzi 
 
 
 Optimal contracting: The view of classical 
economics is that high compensation results 
as companies enter into contracts in order to 
attract and retain qualified CEOs. This theory 
holds that that there is a shortage of capable 
leaders with the necessary general 
management skills, causing the price of those 
skills to increase. The theory also indicates 
that the best paid CEOs are those who 
manage the largest firms. 
 
 Extract rent: Under this theory, termed the 
managerial power approach, CEOs leverage 
their situation to extract the highest possible 
rent. This theory indicates that neither firm size 
nor skills explains the huge increases in 
compensation. 
 
 
 
On reaction to CEO pay, Professor Niessen-Ruenzi states that shareholders do care about 
compensation, as evidenced by rising share prices when boards adopt sound compensation 
plans and negative reactions when golden parachutes are adopted. The discussion around 
say-on-pay provisions has gained a great deal of attention, but these provisions do not exist 
in many countries and indeed, have not made a difference in executive compensation.  
When it comes to public attitudes, much of the public is concerned about income inequality. 
75% of the population believes that executive compensation is too high and it is often this 
public anger that triggers legislation. In boardrooms, such public attitudes are taken into 
account and can play a role in determining the composition of pay. In the 1990s, salary was 
a hot button, so boards limited salaries. In 1993, the issue was stock options. More recently, 
there has been anger about bonuses. In each instance, the board changed the 
components of executive compensation, but not the level. 
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Directors must link CEO pay to performance 
Michel de Fabiani contends that there is no “right” level of CEO compensation. The reality is 
that firms must pay appropriately in order to attract and retain CEOs and other executives 
that are expected to lead increasingly global, increasingly complex companies. The issue is 
when there is no correlation between an individual’s pay and company performance. Pay is 
most problematic when a person leaves a company and still receives a significant payout.  
To help improve the compensation 
equation, Michel de Fabiani suggests: 
 
 
 Benchmarks 
 Alignment of incentives 
 A package of tools 
 Selecting performance criteria 
 Medium and long-term incentives 
 
Benchmarks 
Firms should benchmark the compensation of CEOs against firms in comparable situations.  
 
Alignment of incentives 
Often incentives are not aligned with performance, and as a result a CEO is paid well even 
when his firm doesn’t perform well. Directors should therefore consider making elements of 
compensation variable so they are linked to performance.  
 
A package of tools 
Boards need to pick from a package of tools including salary, bonus, stock options and more. 
The precise tools should be based on the company’s situation.  
 
Selecting performance criteria 
Precise performance targets need to be established and communicated and it is important 
that these criteria are linked with company strategy. Also, instead of absolute criteria, 
performance needs to be looked at in relative terms versus the industry.  
 
Medium and long term 
While annual bonuses may be appropriate, directors should include medium- and long-term 
 incentives.  
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Compensation is both a problem (rent extracting) and a solution 
(optimal contracting). 
 There is no “right” level or structure for CEO compensation, each 
contract should be tailored based on the company’s situation and 
objectives. 
 Optimal contracts should align incentives with performance effectively 
attributable to CEOs. 
____________________________________________________ 
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FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ To what extent should contracts explicitly include social/societal incentives (employee 
     satisfaction, etc.)?  
2/ To what extent are stakeholders’ interests already reflected in the long-term incentives of 
     your organisation (share value, etc.)? 
3/ To what extent would including social/societal incentives undermine the focus of CEOs?  
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3.  How integrity enables sustainable long-term 
 performance  
Mr. Pierre Guyot, CEO, John Deere France 
 
t John Deere, integrity is the fuel for sustainable long-term performance and a core value 
that permeates the entire company. The culture, the brand, the tone at the top and the 
behavior of top executives and mid-level managers all start with integrity. The company has 
a code of conduct, guidelines and management processes that emphasize integrity and 
together, these processes and behaviors differentiate John Deere, increase efficiency and 
fuel strong, sustainable performance. Why is integrity so important for John Deere and how 
does the company go about ensuring integrity throughout the organization?  
 
John Deere is a successful global company built on a foundation of values 
John Deere was founded in 1837. Mr. Deere imported steel from England and used it to make 
plows in the United States. He focused on creating innovative products, growing market 
share and expanding, which included making acquisitions.  
 
Early in the company’s history, Mr. Deere and the company’s other leaders articulated four 
core values - integrity, quality, commitment and innovation – which still provide the driving 
force behind the company. In the past decade, John Deere has been fortunate to have 
strong tailwinds. Around the globe, there is a need for food (particularly grain and protein), 
shelter and infrastructure and as the globe’s population and wealth both rise, this benefits 
John Deere. As a result, the company has grown to $32 billion, with a 7% CAGR over the past 
10 years. John Deere is now focused on becoming a $50 billion company by 2018. 
 
In addition to this strong performance, John Deere has been named a most admired 
company and a most ethical company. Even in China where John Deere has only had 
presence for 10–15 years, Deere is already recognized as a great company. This is equally 
true in Brazil as well, where John Deere has been identified as one of the country’s great 
places to work. 
 
“Values are embedded in the culture and in 
how we do business.” 
                                                       Pierre Guyot 
 
The company’s challenge is to live its values 
 
The company’s values are clear. The challenge is bringing these values to life so that all John 
Deere employees’ behavior is driven by these values each day.  
 
 
John Deere brings corporate values to 
life by:  
 
 
 Guidelines and policies 
 Code of conduct 
 Culture 
 Walk the talk 
 Management processes 
 Seniority 
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Guidelines and policies 
It is important to formally tell employees what is expected of them via specific guidelines and 
policies. 
 
Code of conduct 
The expected behavior has been codified and set forth in a code of conduct. 
 
Culture 
John Deere has created a culture of integrity and compliance. 
 
Walk the talk 
Integrity doesn’t just come through policies; it comes from the tone set at the top of the 
organization by the CEO and the senior executives. It also comes from the “tone from the 
middle” because middle management is closer to the front lines and touches more people. 
 
Management processes 
This includes the processes by which decisions are made. People see how they are arrived at 
and whether this is consistent with the culture and guidelines. 
 
Seniority 
At John Deere, most of the company’s senior leaders have been with the company 20–30 
years. The values and culture have been deeply instilled. 
 
Most importantly, all of these elements come together in how Deere operates on a day-to-
day basis. This includes behaving with integrity with employees, customers and vendors. An 
example of how the company lives its values is that employees are allowed to take 
reasonable risks; even if such risks result in the company losing a significant amount of money, 
the company focuses on the value in learning from the experience. But if an employee 
cheats on an expense report, they are immediately dismissed. 
 
 
“At John Deere, it is all right to make mistakes 
as long as they are made in good faith. But if 
a person cheats on their expense report, they 
are out in one minute. This tells people how 
we do business.” 
                                                       Pierre Guyot 
 
John Deere’s values and how they are lived differentiate the company 
Many companies have values, guidelines, policies and cultures that value integrity. What 
differentiates Deere is linking these values with performance. At Deere, the culture of integrity 
and the way that everyone acts is hard to copy. It creates greater efficiency and greater 
trust with employees, customers and suppliers and the result is a more effective, more 
efficient operation with improved performance. 
 
 
Student Survey findings 
What are the key attributes of a successful CEO (top 3 
rankings)? 
1. Financial and commercial success 
2. Ethical behavior 
3. Takes a strategic view of business 
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_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS 
 Transparency: guidelines for employees, transparency in decision 
processes contribute to trust, an (intangible) asset for the company. 
 Integrity, trust in employees, customers and suppliers translate into 
improved performance in the long run. 
 Long term involvement of senior leaders at John Deere (20-30 years with 
the company) ensures they share a long term view. 
 This favors reasonable risk-taking and investing human capital in the 
company (learning from experience). 
____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ Long-term involvement with the company is key at John Deere’s.  
Long term involvement also has costs (outside experience may be positive, and it lowers the 
incentives to ensure “outside options” which may have value for both employees and 
companies).  
2/ How do long term relationships compare to possible substitutes (compensation, etc.) for 
     giving the incentives to think “long run” in organizations in terms of costs and benefits? 
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4. CEO: power, accountability and transparency  
 
Professor Pino Audia, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Professor Ernst Maug, University of Mannheim, Business School 
Mr. Mats Isaksson, Head of Corporate Affairs Department, OECD 
Mr. Gilles Pélisson, Former Chairman, ACCOR Group; 
 Independent Director, Accenture, TF1, BIC, NH Hotels 
Mr. Peter Solmssen, General Counsel, Siemens 
 
ood corporate governance is about people. For all of the codes and regulations that 
have been introduced in the last 20 years, typically in response to various corporate 
scandals, it is the values, the behavior and the accountability of those at the top which sets 
the tone and determines the relationship that business holds with society. 
And no one is held more accountable than the CEO. Among the corporate scandals that 
have shaped attitudes to business in the last decade, it is the man in the corner office who is 
identified with the behavior and actions of the firm. Kenneth Lay at Enron and Bernie Ebbers 
of Worldcom are forever synonymous with the accounting scandals that wiped billions off 
shareholder value; BP chief Tony Hayward was publicly vilified for his management of his 
company’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. And media magnate Rupert Murdoch found himself 
testifying in front of the UK parliament about allegations of phone hacking and other illegal 
conduct by News Corp. 
Are we right to place the blame so squarely on the shoulders of one individual? 
Few would argue that Kenneth Lay deliberately pursued a path of fraud on a breathtaking 
scale, and that the management style and communication skills of BP’s Tony Hayward fell 
woefully short. In other instances however, the CEO is the scapegoat for board misconduct, 
such as former Olympus CEO Michael Woodford who was dismissed after he made 
allegations about board misconduct involving massive advisory fees in connection with the 
purchase of a UK company. It was only after investigation by authorities in Japan, the UK and 
the US that the company announced that its entire board would resign. 
Either way, the behavior and leadership of the CEO is a vital piece in the corporate 
governance puzzle. Curiously though, most conferences on the subject focus on shareholders 
and boards, overlooking the critical and often unappreciated role that CEOs play in leading 
governance. Because CEOs are often singled out as villains who steal from the company or 
shirk their responsibilities, these conceptions have led to the belief that there is a 
principal/agent problem. But as Mats Isaksson, Head of Corporate Affairs at the OECD insists, 
“a good board can never compensate for a bad CEO but a good CEO can compensate for 
a bad board.” 
 
“We have to encourage CEOs to get more 
involved in corporate governance 
discussions.” 
                                                    Mats Isaksson 
 
Accountability is important for individuals and organizations, but taken too far can have 
negative consequences 
 
Clearly, accountability is important for both individuals and the organization, but Professor 
Pino Audia of the Tuck School of Business argues that when taken too far, accountability and 
the ability of others to judge and pass sanctions can have negative consequences. “Leaders 
are put in the difficult position of having to decide which sources to be accountable to, 
whether that be shareholders, employees, consumers or the media.” And as the amount of 
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information available to the public continues to grow, he believes that the accountability 
pressures on CEOs will only increase, and with it the risk of unintended consequences. “If 
people are only accountable for outcomes, and not processes, they may focus excessively 
on the outcomes.”  Poor decisions as well as unethical decisions can often be traced back to 
an extreme emphasis on outcomes and little regard for the process by which they are 
achieved.   
 
Balancing business operations with corporate governance 
As former Chairman of the world’s largest hotel group, ACCOR, Gilles Pélisson has overseen 
his fair share of quarterly reports, and explains that he has simply come to accept his 
accountability to institutional investors. “As the world moves faster and faster, people want 
and except prompt information,” but for the man who also once ran telecoms giant 
Bouygues Telecom and Euro Disney, he feels that there is a paradox that goes with the role.  
While recognizing the power and resources CEOs might have at their disposal, Pélisson 
contends that running a listed company means you are always short on time. As a 
consequence CEOs are always faced with how to use that precious time, balancing the 
governance with other priorities. “Do you stay at the office and analyze data, or do you walk 
the floor to see first-hand the customer experience?”  
In any case, Pélisson asserts that a CEO doesn’t wake up in the morning focused on 
corporate governance. “Your first thought is serving the customers, and engaging in research 
to know how they think and feel. The next focus is employees, who are key to a company 
manufacturing or delivering its product or service. CEOs must think about how best to 
motivate employees and the values, principles and policies they need to establish.” It is only 
then that CEOs think about governance, including a focus on the size and make-up of the 
company’s board. 
Leadership and responsibility 
With such a potentially decisive role, it is surprising to learn that some large organizations lack 
a real CEO. But that is the contention of Peter Solmssen, General Counsel at German 
industrial conglomerate, Siemens. Solmssen had worked for many years in the senior 
management of GE, “a company with one clear CEO who was the ultimate decision maker 
and who took this responsibility seriously.” Upon moving to Siemens, he saw a culture where 
decisions were made by committee, without clear accountability. At the time of his arrival, a 
bribery scandal was tarnishing the company’s image and threatening its business. 
Recovering from the scandal required a culture change driven not by committee, but by 
strong leadership. The company’s new CEO made integrity the company’s number one 
priority, and led by example. Along the way he sought the involvement and support of all the 
company’s stakeholders, including the labor unions and shareholders, including the Siemens 
family itself. As Solmssen sees it, “there are some things a CEO can’t delegate and has to 
own. While laws and rules are necessary, good governance is about values and behavior, 
which starts at the top.” 
Amidst the challenges of running an 
organization, what is the advice to 
CEOs for setting the governance 
agenda?  
 
 Lead by example 
 Be transparent 
 Leverage the loyalty of employees 
 Leverage the goodwill of customers 
 Set limits 
 
 
1. Lead by example: CEOs are being watched and scrutinized at all times, by all parties. CEOs 
can never relax and must always be role models, especially in a crisis.  
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2. Be transparent: CEOs will be asked hard questions, such as how can they justify their 
compensation. They must be transparent in their answers and must be able to simultaneously 
balance two objectives. The first is to deliver a consistent, uniform message about what the 
company does. The second is to tailor the message to each distinct audience. 
3. Leverage the loyalty of employees: Employees want to feel that they belong. If CEOs can 
achieve that, they will generate loyalty among employees who will then go above and 
beyond what they are being asked. 
4. Leverage the good will of customers: Companies are often afraid of social media, but you 
need to create communities that will help you. Social media is a reality and it can be 
leveraged to create influential support.  
5. Set limits: CEOs can’t let each employee behave as they see fit. Diverse global companies, 
with employees around the world, must have clear and specific rules to guide behavior on 
issues like gift policies or expenses. It is the CEOs job to say, “Here are the rules.” 
Will such behavior help to rebuild society’s trust in corporations and their executives? 
When asked how credible they would deem information about a company that came from 
a CEO, just 38% of the global respondents to the 2012 Edelman Trust Barometer said they 
would trust the information, down from 50% last year. It was the biggest drop since the survey 
began 12 years ago. Clearly the public remains skeptical, but for Professor Ernst Maug of the 
University of Mannheim Business School, this is in part a communication gap that influences 
public perception. 
 
“It’s time to put the human aspect back into 
the governance equation and find a 
common language with society.” 
                                          Professor Ernst Maug 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS  
 The CEO is the focal point in a company’s governance: being the 
ultimate decision maker, he is ultimately responsible before all 
stakeholders.  
 Being the reference, he must lead by example. 
Two caveats:  
 Excessive accountability on CEOs may lead to the wrong incentives 
(e.g. accountability for outcomes such as quarterly results)  
 The CEO’s paradox: watched by everyone yet alone. 
____________________________________________________ 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
Loneliness and accountability: group decision making often leads to better decisions, but 
can also be used by individuals to try to protect themselves from the consequences of bad 
decisions:  
1/ Which decisions should be efficiently delegated/taken by the Board?  
2/ Is the efficient delegation the same in terms of crisis (What are the respective roles of the 
    CEOs and the Board in times of crisis)? 
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5. Media scrutiny and CEO effectiveness  
 
Professor Katsuhiko Shimizu, Keio Business School 
Ms. Marret Arfsten, MBA Student, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
Mr. Zhi Hao Kevin Tay, MBA Student, Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth 
 
 
EOs are under intense pressure, especially in a crisis. A relentless media cycle and the 
explosion of social media have intensified this pressure and scrutiny. For CEOs to be 
effective, they need to respond to a crisis calmly and confidently, show an ability to lead, 
take responsibility and deal with the onslaught of attention. Boards must take this into 
account when selecting a CEO and ensure that the CEO leads the organization to develop 
crisis response and social media plans. 
For Tuck Professor Pino Audia, the intense scrutiny of the media often overlooks the 
complexity of being a CEO, and how his or her decisions are impacted by the environment in 
which they operate. “Context is very important for those decisions,” he explains, “and brings 
better understanding of their leadership”. 
To illustrate the impact that accountability pressures arising from the media may have on 
CEOs’ decisions, Tuck School of Business students, Ms. Marret Arfsten and Mr. Zhi Hao Kevin 
Tay, under Professor Pino Audia’s supervision, led a workshop that focused on the BP oil spill 
and the communications during this crisis by BP CEO Tony Hayward. Professor Katsuhiko 
Shimizu of the Keio Business School moderated facilitated the workshop.   
Case Study of BP Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico 
On April 20, 2010 an oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico exploded, killing 11 individuals and causing 
millions of gallons of oil to spill into the Gulf over three months until the flow was capped. The 
rig was operated by Transocean, a vendor of BP. This is the largest oil spill in history, surpassing 
the Exxon Valdez spill from 1989, which at the time was the largest oil spill in U.S. history. 
While BP CEO Tony Hayward initially handled this crisis well, his effectiveness decreased over 
time. 
Quickly following this explosion, Mr. Hayward went to the accident site. He was visible and 
transparent with the media, and showed empathy. He took responsibility on behalf of BP for 
the accident and the clean-up. This is in contrast to the reaction of Exxon’s CEO who didn’t 
visit the site of the Valdez spill for some time and assigned blame to others. 
But over the next six weeks, Mr. Hayward began deflecting blame, shifting responsibility, and 
lost his composure when he uttered, “I just want my life back.” Five months after the flow of oil 
was capped Mr. Hayward was dismissed from his position. In contrast, Exxon’s CEO stayed on 
for four years after the Valdez disaster. 
The emergence of the internet created a more challenging environment for BP than Exxon. 
The amount of media coverage and the nature of this coverage were far different in 2010 
than in 1989. In the six months following the accident, there were 20 times more articles about 
the BP incident than the Exxon event, and the percentage of articles mentioning the CEO 
was also far higher. More than 10% of articles mentioned Tony Hayward; during one month he 
was mentioned in about 20% of articles. Exxon’s CEO was only named in about 10% of articles 
during two months. 
There are many steps BP could have taken to improve their handling of this crisis, including: 
 Revising the CEO selection process: Attendees believed that BP’s board failed to consider 
how Mr. Hayward would respond in a crisis, and that he was clearly not up to the task. 
Boards must consider the ability of a CEO to function in such a situation. 
 Having crisis communication plans: Attendees faulted BP for not being more prepared, 
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with a plan in hand that the company was ready to execute. 
 Having a social media manager: One attendee said many companies now have a 
person who is responsible for blogging or tweeting on behalf of the CEO, something that 
BP did not have. 
 
As pressure mounts, CEOs’ judgment can become impaired, and they may engage in 
defensive coping mechanisms 
There are three reactions that companies and executives should avoid in difficult situations: 
1. Impression management. They try to shape how they are viewed by taking out ads in 
newspapers and having their pictures taken with victims (BP and Exxon). 
2. Self-justification. The try to justify their actions, pass the buck and procrastinate (BP and 
Exxon). 
3. Cognitive overload. They become overloaded because they feel they are being 
chased and held personally accountable (BP).  
Being a CEO is clearly challenging, and to serve in this role, CEOs need to put their own 
personal lives aside and prepare for worst-case scenarios. 
 
 
Student Survey findings 
With the increased scrutiny of the decisions of CEOs, I 
feel less willing to aspire to a CEO role at a public 
company. All Schools combined: 
Disagree: 59% 
Agree: 23% 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS  
 In selecting CEOs, boards should consider both times of stability and 
times of crisis. 
 Information technology amplifies the pressure on CEOs in times of crisis, 
calling for an adequate and quick response from the CEO. 
 Transparency and public accountability: CEOs are expected to lead by 
example even in the worst-case scenarios. 
____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ To what extent are the same competencies expected from CEOs in times of stability and in 
     times of crisis? 
2/ To what extent has your CEO/organization endorsed or set up a crisis response process and 
    social media plans? What concrete benefits, in terms of your stakeholder ecosystem, 
    do/would these bring you company?     
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6. Accountability and its Limits – the Siemens case 
 
 
Mr. Peter Solmssen, General Counsel, Siemens 
iemens was involved in a corruption scandal that threatened the viability of the company. 
Peter Solmssen, General Counsel for the firm, presents how the company responded. 
Siemens has long been a technology leader, a highly international company and a 
company that didn’t shy away from risk taking. But in 2006, following record revenue growth, 
Siemens was implicated for paying bribes to government officials. This led to a massive 
investigation, arrests and a tarnishing of the Siemens reputation. 
 
Siemens anticipated fines and penalties up to $10 billion, and was confident it could deal 
with these penalties. However, more concerning was the ability to continue securing 
government contracts, which is the lifeblood of the company’s business. 
The company undertook its own massive investigation which included offering amnesty to 
employees to share what they knew, which many employees accepted and in the process 
disclosed secret banks accounts used to pay bribes and lies told to the board. Siemens 
replaced most members of executive management, named a new CEO and brought in Mr. 
Solmssen from GE as general counsel. 
Within two years Siemens was out of the fire. The investigation was complete, the company 
was able to continue as a government contractor and a settlement was reached with the 
U.S. Department of Justice. 
Several myths surrounded this situation. 
In learning what had happened, Mr. Solmssen observed that the culture didn’t involve 
lawyers to ensure that laws were followed, and decisions were made by committee, without 
one person being responsible.  
 
Observations on the 
Siemens scandal:  
 
 Myth: This behavior used to be legal. In fact, it wasn’t. It 
was accepted and hadn’t been caught.  
 Myth: Everyone does it (pays bribes). This isn’t true. 
Companies such as GE and IBM are completely clean.  
 Myth: We have to pay bribes to succeed. Not true. Since 
Siemens has been completely clean, the company has 
gained market share and had record profits.  
 Myth: The U.S. government was out to get Siemens to 
help GE. Not true. Having previously been at GE, Mr. 
Solmssen knows that the U.S. government was not out to 
get Siemens and wasn’t trying to help GE.  
 
 
Recovering from this scandal has required culture change driven by strong leadership. 
Emerging from this scandal took strong leadership. The company’s new CEO made integrity 
the company’s leading priority. He didn’t delegate; he led by example. Governance was 
addressed, the company became focused on integrity in its financial statements, a cadre of 
real CFOs was brought in and for the first time Siemens created a real general counsel 
position. All of these actions were embraced by the company’s employees. 
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The company’s strategy has been to repair its image and change the rules of the game by 
telling its story in public forums, such as this conference and the World Economic Forum in 
Davos. The message is, “We are better off than we were,” because paying bribes is unethical, 
costly and risky. Other ways Siemens has exercised leadership is by forming “cartels of the 
good.” In such cartels, companies commit to being clean. Siemens has worked with these 
cartels, trade associations and governments to produce collective action that eliminates 
paying bribes. Siemens also shares best practices with other companies, so they can learn 
from Siemens’ experience. 
 
 
“The leader has to make it clear that integrity 
is the number one priority.” 
                                                  Peter Solmssen 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
INSIGHTS  
 Although Corporate Governance is not about ethical 
behavior/respecting laws, good corporate governance requires ethics 
following the law as a minimum. 
 Clear responsibility helps prevent unethical/unlawful behavior. 
 CEOs and directors must have unquestionable ethical standards. 
____________________________________________________ 
 
FOOD FOR THOUGHT… 
1/ When does the pressure of accountability induce leaders to unethical/unlawful behavior? 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
“Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu“- “I am because you are, you are because we are.”  
 
Unknown 
 
A Global Alliance of Schools of Management  
 
COUNCIL ON BUSINESS AND SOCIETY  
 
he Council On Business And Society: Six leading international Business Schools with a shared 
commitment and belief in humanism and the power of academic excellence transposed 
into business excellence, innovation and transformational leadership.  
 
The Council’s mission is to create a multi-school process to study a series of critical issues 
facing business and society, organize international forums for dialogue and develop and 
disseminate educational materials and insights designed to foster continuing debate on the 
issues covered.  
 
THE WHITE PAPER 
 
Based on the contributions of the 1st Annual Forum on Corporate Governance and 
Leadership in a Global World, November 16 – 17, 2012, this White Paper has provided many 
insights from a multi-level, multicultural perspective that bring to light three focal points of 
debate, reflection and recommendation for effective governance and leadership:  
 
 Sense of ownership 
 Transparency 
 Long-term view. 
 
Rather than opposing shareholders to society, or shareholders to management, the findings 
of this White Paper focus on convergence to produce a positive conclusion. Underlying these 
focal points is the notion that governance and leadership include the wider perspective of a 
company’s ecosystem of stakeholders: its employees, auditors, investors, the communities 
upon which it has an impact, the media and legislating bodies.  
 
External rules and obligations of compliance are essential, as are indeed the internal 
mechanisms, on both a human and systemic level, of the company itself that include 
company values, codes of governance and codes of ethics or conduct. Self-discipline within, 
combined with positive external guidelines and monitoring, serve to generate stability, foster 
trust, build reputation and contribute to the long-term performance and meaning of a 
company.  
 
Within the context of the economic shift of balance from West to East, financial crises and the 
impact of almost instant global communication, this White Paper provides many insights and 
points for reflection which we hope will provide a basis for the positive strengthening of 
corporate governance and leadership within your organizations.    
 
For further information or insight into our work, partners and fields of expertise, The Council On 
Business And Society invites you visit its website or refer to our list of Council and School 
contacts.   
 
www.councilonbusinessandsociety.com 
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BOARD OF DEANS  
 
PIERRE TAPIE 
ESSEC Business School 
 
Dean Tapie holds an Engineering degree from the Ecole Polytechnique of Paris, a PhD. In 
Biophysics from University Paris XI and an MBA from INSEAD 
Dean of ESSEC since 2001, Pierre Tapie was Dean of Purpan Graduate School of Engineering 
and CEO of Intellagri. He currently serves as Chairman of the Conférence des Grandes Ecoles 
and a member of the AACSB’s internationalization task force. From 2008-11, he was also 
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from 1998-2006. She is also a visiting scholar at IFM -University of Cambridge, was visiting 
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